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Introduction 
 
"Market-dominant (ethnic) minorities 
are the Achilles' heel of free market 
democracy." (Chua 2003, 6) 
 
As would-be social scientists we are initially taught and then quite often reminded that 
global expansion of free trade and investment, and adoption of democratic practices by 
previously authoritarian regimes lead to peace. A nation trades, it becomes richer, 
democratic, and eventually, peace-loving, no matter its internal ethnic configuration. The 
spread of free markets and democracy tends to turn all enemies into 'competitors' 
(Friedman 2000, xvi). Hence, one simply does not bad-mouth globalization. Nor does 
one bad-mouth democracy. 
 This project deflects from such a priori knowledge and draws inspiration from 
rather different sources. Our principal objective is to map ethnicity onto democracy and 
globalization. We note that a number of scholars have suggested that a variety of 
integrative forces embedded in globalization do indeed open avenues for mobilization 
along ethnic lines and ethnic conflict (Appadurai 1996; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Tilly 
2003; Olzak 2011) and that democracy does contribute to the risk of armed conflict in 
ethnically fractionalized societies (Cederman and Girardin 2007, Rutherford et al. 2015).  
 However, by far the most important stimulus for our research was generated by 
the findings of Amy Chua, an American legal scholar of Sino-Philippine descent. In her 
study World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and 
Global Instability (2003), preceded by other three articles on globalization, markets, 
democracy and ethnicity published in 1995, 1998 and 2000, Chua hypothesizes that a 
phenomenon she names market-dominant minorities turns free market democracy into 
an engine of ethnic conflagration (2003, 6). The presence of market-dominant 
minorities, ethnic groups that tend to economically dominate the indigenous majorities 
around them under market conditions, repeatedly catalyzed ethnic conflict with 
catastrophic consequences across the globe (Chua 2003, 17).  
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 Market-dominant minorities typically control large parts of the economy, as, 
among others, the Lebanese in West Africa or the Palestinians in the Caribbean, and are 
disproportionally favoured by globalizing markets. Therefore, growing internal 
socioeconomic inequalities may lead to resentment among the impoverished majority, 
generating three types of backlashes. One is a backlash against democracy, where 
market-dominant minorities align themselves with corrupt indigenous leaders, forming 
what is generally known as crony capitalism (Chua 2003, 147-162). Second kind of 
backlash, one against the market, is evident whenever the majority prevails and strives 
to expropriate the market-dominant minority, confiscating and/or nationalizing its 
property and businesses (Chua 2003, 127-145). Finally, there can be a backlash against 
the market-dominant minority itself, leading to discrimination, internal violence, riots 
and pogroms not contained by state repression or even additionally stimulated by 
office-seeking demagogues and populists (Chua 2003, 163-175; Bezemer and Jong-a-Pin 
2013, 108). We have decided to explore the third outcome identified by Amy Chua, 
namely that adoption of democratic practices and globalization leads to more ethnic 
discrimination and violence in the presence of market-dominant minorities. 
 Furthermore, we shall focus our attention on the region of Southeast Asia, 
encompassing Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam in the period after 1945, for one ethnic group, the 
Chinese, is present in all these countries (apart from Singapore, where the Chinese are in 
fact the ethnic majority), dominating their economies (Chua 2003, 6). Before fixating our 
attention to the Chinese as the market-dominant minority in Southeast Asia, we wish to 
explore the link of aggregate levels of ethnic conflict in the region with democracy and 
globalization. Ultimately, we want to determine whether there is a clear connection 
between the way in which the Chinese minority is treated in the region and the changes 
in the nature of Southeast Asian political regimes from autocracy to democracy, in the 
context of globalization.   
 Bearing this in mind, in this project we intend to test a pair of hypotheses. Firstly, 
we wish to verify that in Southeast Asia after 1945 democratic regimes, more firmly 
integrated within the global economic and financial system and pursuing free market 
policies, are more prone to internal ethnic conflict and discrimination. Secondly, we shall 
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test the claim that the Chinese ethnic groups in Southeast Asian countries are more 
likely to be discriminated against in democratic regimes that endorse the global market. 
  To the best of our knowledge, these hypotheses have not been examined 
empirically. Although quite provocative and intellectually stimulating, Amy Chua's 
claims on market-dominant minorities, democracy and globalization are based 
exclusively on anecdotal evidence, existing literature, news reports or interviews the 
author had administered herself. To test the extent to which her arguments relate to 
social realities of Southeast Asia, we are going to conduct a quantitative study. We have 
decided to complete a country-level dataset, with data ranging from 1945 to 2013, from 
the existing bases accessible online, formulate our own research variables conducive to 
our hypotheses and analyze them using the twentieth version of the IBM's Statistical 
Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software. 
 The project is structured as follows: in the first chapter we elaborate on the 
choice of our research subject. We shall strive to pinpoint the relevance of our 
hypotheses to Southeast Asia and to position both the region and the works of Amy Chua 
within the wider literature on ethnic conflict, democracy and globalization. The aim of 
such an endeavour is also to argue for the importance of the Chinese market-dominant 
minority in the broader ethnic politics' dynamics of this part of the world. The second 
chapter addresses our data and applied methodology. Here we define all our variables, 
particularize the exploited sources of data and present our methods of analysis, 
including the multiple linear regression model used upon the second hypothesis. 
Chapter two's primary objective is to outline the way in which we wish to operationalize 
our research hypotheses. Chapter three brings the results of all the analyses to the fore. 
In this section of the project we shall present our findings and accept or reject our 
original hypotheses. In the fourth chapter we offer a wider discussion on the research 
outcomes. We shall not only seek to connect our findings with the existing literature and 
compare the region we had under scrutiny with others, but highlight the weaknesses 
and strengths of our methodology and our general conclusions. Finally, the fifth part of 
this project - the conclusion - brings together all research segments and lays out our 
final thoughts on the main problems. Here we conclude the project with a deliberation 
on the ways in which this academic investigation deepened our understanding of 
ethnicity, democracy and globalization.  
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I Problem Formulation 
 
1. 1. Introduction 
 
In the following chapter we wish to outline the intellectual considerations that underlie 
our two hypotheses, explain the reasoning behind our methodology and the choice of 
Southeast Asia as the region to be placed under scrutiny. In the first sub-section we will 
examine the ideational foundation of stable societies and political orders and the 
interplay between democracy and ethnicity. In the second sub-section we explore Amy 
Chua’s argumentation and tie it to the previously addressed issues. Finally, in the third 
sub-section we shall explain our choice of methodology and subject for this project. 
 The aim of this chapter is to offer a clear formulation of the research problem at 
hand and mark the boundaries of this project, defining and explaining all the most 
important concepts to be used further on. 
 
1. 2. Intellectual Background 
 
In our project we align ourselves with a realist tradition of scepticism towards 
democracy as a universal model for all societies at all times. In this respect we find 
ourselves in opposition to the current global democratic thinking that dominates 
development and globalization theory and policy (Archibugi 2008; Held 2010). As 
Western powers are still dominant in the major international institutions, it is their 
prejudices and preferences that set the intellectual tone and framework for modern 
state development.  
 Samuel P. Huntington, the esteemed American political scientist, examined the 
problem of Western elites being increasingly grounded, or ungrounded, in a globalist 
identity, far removed from the nationalist orientation that characterized previous 
generations of elites. He coined the term Davos Men to describe the modern elites that 
have more in common with each other than with their own national populations 
(Huntington 2004).  This is true of political and corporate leaders as well as "policy 
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wonks" and academic intellectuals. Amy Chua gives a caricature of the globalist 
cosmopolitan view: "The prevailing view among globalization's supporters is that 
markets and democracy are a kind of universal prescription for the multiple ills of 
underdevelopment. Market capitalism is the most efficient economic system the world 
has ever known. Democracy is the fairest political system the world has ever known and 
the one most respectful of individual liberty. Working hand in hand, markets and 
democracy will gradually transform the world into a community of prosperous, war-
shunning nations, and individuals into liberal, civic-minded citizens and consumers. In 
the process, ethnic hatred, religious zealotry, and other backward aspects of 
underdevelopment will be swept away" (Chua 2003, 15).  
 While Amy Chua paints a more extreme version of the modal globalist, democracy 
has indeed become the operational prerequisite in the development community. This is 
not only due to the empirical case for it, but as much a result of democracy being the 
only system that holds moral legitimacy in the West. Therefore, any appeal to democracy 
will generally find support in the Western intellectual class. This could be most clearly 
seen during the Arab Spring, where democratic optimism swept the Western media. Nor 
is this bias peculiar to democracy advocacy. Psychologists have found that behavioural 
scientists routinely make broad extrapolations based on studies done on Western 
research subjects, and often university students. The underlying assumption is that 
there is little variation across human populations, or that these standard subjects are as 
representative as any other population, whereas in reality the Western, educated, 
industrialized, rich and democratic (WEIRD) are particularly unusual when compared 
with the rest of humanity - frequent outliers and are among the least representative 
populations one could find for generalizing about human nature (Henrich et al. 2010). 
  In this light we believe that a similar WEIRD bias pervades the field of global 
studies and political science. Our operating assumptions are focused on perils of a 
diverse polity that cannot be united for the common good and will instead devolve into 
factionalism that undermines good governance. These are not new insights but draw 
from old thinkers of political science and newer works in the fields of sociology, 
anthropology and psychology. We will explore both these new and antecedent thinkers 
in the following section. 
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1. 2. 1. Roadblocks on the way to Denmark 
 
In Francis Fukuyama's extensive work on the establishment of political institutions, The 
Origins of Political Order (2011), he draws on the phrase "getting to Denmark" from the 
development community. "For people in developed countries, Denmark is a mythical 
place that is known to have good political and economic institutions: it is stable, 
democratic, peaceful, prosperous, inclusive, and has extremely low levels of political 
corruption" (Fukuyama 2011, 43). 
 We are not addressing age old development problems of how to maximize 
growth, provide security and health or the best political, institutional setup. We are 
instead focusing on some of the social obstacles that would get in the way of such a 
technocratic and democratic regime. If the question is why "cannot they 
(underdeveloped states) be more like Denmark?", we shall strive to offer a number of 
answers in this chapter. We shall try to explain some of the social foundations we 
believe are crucial for establishing an effective state and cohesive, stable socio-economic 
relations.  
 
a) The General Will 
 
Digging deep into the intellectual first principles undergirding our thinking, we find that 
the fundamental problem "plaguing" ethnically diverse polities is the question of "who, 
whom?", first raised by Lenin in 1921. If certain values are not widely held and shared 
among competing groups within a community, then broad cooperation is imperilled and 
the ideal approximation of a common interest becomes an illusory goal. Instead, there 
will be political race to the top (political power) with a resultant race to the civic bottom, 
exemplified with factional groups behaving like actors in rational choice models that 
assume complete individual self-interest.  
 We will explore the thinking of Plato and Jean-Jacques Rousseau on the ideal 
social foundation. They were quite distinct thinkers, but shared a concern for uniformity 
as the basis of a cohesive and legitimate society. The Hellenic philosopher Plato 
developed his theory of the ideal state in The Republic. For his purposes, there was no 
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distinction between state and society. Like modern day globalists he had focused on the 
concept of citizenship as the crucial building block of the state. While globalists urge for 
a more expansive definition of citizenship, Plato's own definition could hardly have been 
more limiting. In Plato's conception of citizenship, membership was restricted towards 
those people who belonged to the same community of values and he did not believe that 
people living within a political system had an inherent right for citizenship if they did 
not "share certain institutions and ways of life with similarly educated people" 
(Mumford 1922, 39-40). This political community was severely limited in a 
demographic sense to 5,000 people. This was the amount at which Plato believed it was 
conceivable to have a functioning shared community (Mumford 1922, 39). 
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau's social contract was likewise an expression of the 
commonly held "general will" of the community and it was only through this mythic 
spirit that a ruler could gain legitimacy. What is interesting about Rousseau's social 
contract is that he never intended it to be a blueprint for a national or even a global 
polity. Not only did his imagined community apply to the small city state of Geneva, with 
mere 30,000 inhabitants, but was really restricted to opening up rule of power to 
competing power centres in Geneva (Hoppe 2001, 104). 
 An interesting aside is that he stressed direct democracy which is why he 
favoured small city-states. Rousseau lived at a time when monarchs claimed to embody 
a divine right to rule and sought an alliance with the merchant class, mercantilism, to 
make an end run around the nobility. Rousseau opposed both and thought that a 
monarch would be more suitable for a larger nation, where city-states would not be 
viable, on the condition that he ruled according to the general will.   
 For Rousseau it was paramount that the polity in question would be highly 
uniform in order for the general will to be realizable in the political system. As such 
Rousseau was particularly sceptical of any kind of diversity, whether occupational, 
cultural or economic (inequality) in nature (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy 
2010). Within this community, Rousseau saw the greatest threats from a lack of 
virtuousness on the part of individuals. The other great threat was factionalism that 
would subvert the general will. In modern popular thinking democracy is characterized 
by intense debate and the ability to work out disagreements, but this was not in line 
with Rousseau's thinking. Instead, he thought that the key pillar for a successful 
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democracy was consensus. Both Plato and Rousseau had radically different conceptions 
of the purpose of government and what pursuits the ideal society should follow, but they 
both stressed a homogeneous polity as an essential ingredient in order to reach those 
goals. And it is particularly interesting that both had clear spatial limits on the ideal 
society. Both were operating with the city-state as the optimal level. Neither philosopher 
dealt with the issue of ethnic diversity, but they would likely follow our line in thinking 
as they were both fearful of cultural, economic and other forms of diversity. 
 
b) Kinship and Ethnicity 
 
In 1968 Samuel P. Huntington wrote a classic work on development and modernization, 
Political Order in Changing Societies. He focused on the establishment of order as the 
prerequisite for modernization, betraying a clear Hobbesian influence. His belief was 
that rapid social change in the underdeveloped world was likely to create tension filled 
and conflict ridden societies. In his work, Huntington followed modernization thinking 
of the time in assuming that institutions, as the state, political parties, law, military 
organizations, and the like, all exist, without giving an account of where they came from 
in the first place (Huntington 1968; Fukuyama 2011, 14).  
 In Fukuyama's large update of Huntington he tries to uncover how some of these 
institutions and others developed over time. For centuries political scientists and 
political philosophers have grounded their theories on how humans interact in a "state 
of nature". The issue at hand was whether or not human beings naturally cooperate or 
fight when left to their own devices. For Rousseau, it was society that was at fault for the 
violence of man and instead "man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains" 
(Rousseau 1983, 1). In short, the natural man was a noble savage. For Hobbes, man was 
just savage. In Fukuyama's account, the state of nature was a useful metaphor, but 
ahistorical, and with the development of the life sciences it was important to draw 
lessons from the works on pre-modern societies. In Fukuyama's own attempt at nation 
building in Melanesia he found out that the human norm is politics without much 
political philosophy, with people voting for the tribal leader, the Big Man, who would be 
sure to represent their tribe well (Sailer 2011). 
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 This might seem irrelevant to the questions of ethnicity and democracy, but they 
are in fact crucial, because modern research has found the same persistent patterns in 
many of the more modern, but still underdeveloped societies in the world.  We will 
argue in the discussion that it was partly due to Europe's own handling of the kinship 
question that it was able to overcome the conflicts that had long plagued it.  As noted in 
the previous section, the question of how to create a functioning political order and 
institutions has puzzled political thinkers for millennia.  
 Paralleling this train of thought were the biologists who struggled with the same 
question, but concerning the entire animal kingdom. Since Charles Darwin's 
breakthrough with On the Origin of Species (1859), there had been a steady 
accumulation of knowledge regarding human and animalistic behaviour. One mystery 
that remained was how to explain altruism. It had been observed in nature that animals 
of the same species and flock would help one another when in danger. The Darwinian 
logic predicted the self interest of the individual species and the survival of the fittest - 
so how could this conform to the observed contradiction? For humanists, this was 
explained by the fact that humans had eventually overcome evolution through 
civilization and culture, and were now directing their own destiny. There is partial truth 
to this account but these factors only speeded up evolution and made man a co-director 
(Cochran, 2009). 
 The answer was identified in 1964 when the famous biologist and evolutionary 
theorist, William Hamilton, discovered the mathematical logic behind altruism 
(Hamilton 1964). Rather than being founded in irrationalism, altruism was caused by 
the sharing of genes between close relatives. As such it made sense to sacrifice oneself to 
improve the likelihood of survival for a related kin. Another prominent evolutionary 
biologist, J. B. S. Haldane foresaw Hamilton's discovery of kin selection and gave a brief 
explanation of the Darwinian logic behind it. When asked if he would give his life for a 
drowning brother he famously replied: "No, but I would save two brothers or eight 
cousins" (McElreath and Boyd 2007, 82). The actual workings and implications of kin 
selection through altruism have been disputed ever since. Richard Dawkins popularized 
Hamilton's work with The Selfish Gene (1974), but he long denied the implication for 
human societies outside of close relatives (Miele 1995; Hamilton 2005, 330).  
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 Social scientists have since been sparse to pick up the thread of Hamilton and 
Dawkins, often ignoring the breakthroughs in the natural sciences and its implications.  
For this reason Fukuyama has explored the insights of both biology and anthropology, 
since they give an insight into the inner workings and default settings of mankind in the 
aforementioned state of nature and beyond. As the example from Fukuyama's own 
research experience in Melanesia suggests, the fundamental and pre-modern political 
organization is the tribe and in some parts of the world this still has a hold on the 
decision making, whether political, social or economic. The persistent tribal nature of 
societies has often surprised ambitious development economists and nation builders 
alike (Easterly and Levine 1996; Weiner 2013). 
 A researcher who directly tried to use biological kinship as the basis of a social 
theory of ethnicity and conflict was the anthropologist Pierre van Den Berghe. In The 
Ethnic Phenomenon he coined the term "ethnic nepotism" to describe how ethnic, racial 
and tribal groups would follow the same patterns seen in close kinship groups (Den 
Berghe 1981). In his work he tries to marry the class theory of Marx with ethnicity by 
replacing class with kinship. Marx's class theory captured intellectual and, to a lesser 
extent, the popular attention because it seemed to have enough explanatory power to 
make sense of the world. Besides its reliance on determinism, it suffered from the 
elusiveness of a clear definition of class. This problem was exacerbated by the 
multiplication and distinctiveness of socio-economic categories that developed in the 
20th century. In contrast, ethnicity and race are clearer cut, despite their socially 
constructed features.  
 Much of the criticism of Den Berghe's theory comes from a conventional and long 
held view in social and cultural anthropology that evolution stopped 50,000 years ago 
and that ethnicity and race are merely social constructs. In fact, the human genome 
project has continually shown the opposite. It is exactly because population groups have 
evolved in different environments and in a relatively endogenous inbreeding that 
forensic anthropologists can identify the racial and even ethnic identity based on their 
bones. The same breakthroughs have increasingly been found in medicine (Wade 2005; 
Tersigni-Tarrant and Shirley 2012, 235). 
 This does not mean that ethnic nepotism should be taken at face value as a 
biological determinant. However, the breakup of the communist world and the 
immediate descent into ethnic strife in the Balkans seemed to confirm the staying power 
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of ethnic nepotism as a predictor of conflict. Den Berghe himself argued human 
behaviour could be broken down to a genetic, ecological and cultural level, with all three 
being interrelated and dynamic (Den Berghe 1981, 6). But it is precisely because ethnic 
nepotism is rooted, at least partially, in human nature that it can be so potent. The 
problem of ethnic nepotism is a recurring theme in Fukuyama's book and it is a question 
he wrestles with. While loyalty to one's kin is natural and pervasive in human history, it 
is also an inherently retarding feature for any society trying to modernize (Anderson 
2006; Fukuyama 2011, 262).   
 The point Hamilton and Den Berghe raised was not merely that ethnic and racial 
groups act as if they are extended families, but that from a biological point of view they 
are to a degree. The partial social construction of ethnicity meant that physical, cultural 
and lingual markers would serve to bolster perceptions of commonality, and therefore 
shared ancestry, with co-nationals. In this sense, it did not matter whether two people 
were actually of common descent as long as this seemed to be the case (James and 
Goetze 2001, 59). 
 The flipside of ethnic altruism and solidarity is ethnocentrism and nationalism. 
Because humans have limited resources to distribute, the out-groups will suffer 
compared to the in-group. For this reason intra-ethnic struggles resemble tribal and 
family feuds of more primitive societies. What is open for debate is how strong the links 
are between individuals in an ethnic or racial group, and what psychological 
mechanisms operate behind them (James and Goetze 2001, 39). 
 
c) Social Welfare and Ethnic Diversity 
 
Frank Salter, an Australian political scientist, has tried to incorporate ethnic nepotism in 
the study of social relations and welfare (Salter 2003; 2004). In line with Amy Chua, he 
has found that on an unconscious level we are more likely to support people who 
resemble us ethnically. The ability to recognize differences between ethnic and racial 
groups, and attribute bias accordingly, appears at very a young age, even under the most 
tolerant conditions (Bronson and Merryman 2009). Robert Axelrod, political scientist, 
argues that Darwinian ethnocentrism is one of ten mechanisms that "can, under 
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different circumstances, support cooperation among egoists" (Axelrod and Hammond 
2003, 3). 
 The dark side of ethnic nepotism and ethnocentrism was explored by Robert 
Putnam in one of the largest studies of American cities (Putnam, 2007). He found that 
even when controlling for wealth and safety levels, "diversity correlates with less trust 
of neighbours, lower confidence in local politicians and news media, less charitable 
giving and volunteering, fewer close friends, and less happiness" (Leo 2007). 
 In the post-1945 era contact theory dominated social theory in sociology, but 
Putnam's results do much to question it.  As Putnam puts it himself: "the contact theory 
is alluring, but I think it is fair to say that most (though not all) empirical studies have 
tended instead to support the so-called conflict theory, which suggests that, for various 
reasons, but above all contention over limited resources, diversity fosters out-group 
distrust and in-group solidarity. On this theory, the more we are brought into physical 
proximity with people of another race or ethnic background, the more we stick to our 
own and the less we trust the other" (Putnam 2007, 6). 
 This is backed up by Frank Salter's and other empirical studies that show that 
rising ethnic diversity leads to ethnic stratification, as found in the United States, 
Canada, and Britain. Moreover, in such cases welfare tends to decline: "wealthier tax-
payers who disproportionately foot the welfare bill, are more willing to subsidize the 
needy from their own ethnies than those from others; welfare and compassion are 
positively valued, while privation and exclusion are negatively valued. These values are 
affected on a mass scale by ethnic nepotism, and that phenomenon serves the genetic 
interests of the discriminating taxpayers” (Salter 2003, 80). 
 Ultimately, in their 2005 book on poverty in America and Europe, Alesina and 
Glaeser find that race and ethnicity can explain up to half the difference in welfare 
spending between Europe and America. They also predict that increasing societal 
heterogeneity will make Europe adopt a more American welfare model with reduced 
spending.  This is backed up by the recent rise of nationalistic social-democratic parties, 
in an otherwise tolerant Europe, that are increasingly opposing non-ethnic groups 
receiving welfare and enjoying public goods. As the British progressive commentator, 
David Goodhart, noted in a controversial article for the Guardian "sharing and solidarity 
can conflict with diversity" (Goodhart 2004). 
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 After having exposed in this manner the three obstacles, as we see them, to 
stability in ethnically diverse polities, in the next sub-section we move on to link them 
with the works of Amy Chua on democracy, globalization and market-dominant ethnic 
minorities. Here we wish to point out that ethnicity is also used in this project to 
encompass tribal, racial and religious affiliation, unless otherwise noted. 
 
1. 3. Democracy, Globalization and Market-Dominant Minorities 
 
In our critique of democracy we are focusing on the narrow and very popular version of 
it, encompassing the openness of political competition and executive recruitment, 
leading to majoritarian rule (Marshal and Gurr 2014). For we believe that in this 
particular form democracy can be destructive as it is beholden to popular sentiment, 
whatever that may be. This is distinct from the constitutional liberal democracy model 
that is celebrated today. It is because liberal democracy has been so successful on the 
intellectual battlefield that it is forgotten that many restraints had to be imposed on the 
system in order for it to resemble what we cherish today. The idea of human rights or 
independent constitutional courts are decidedly anti-democratic institutions created to 
check democracy against its worst excesses. 
 Today the popular sentiment towards democracy is at worst expressed by the 
Churchill’s famous quip: "Democracy is the worst form of government except all those 
other forms that have been tried from time to time" (Churchill 1947), and at best it is 
used widely outside of the political realm with glowing connotations. However, this was 
not always the case. For this reason well into the 19th century we still found harsh 
critiques of democracy and especially of any potential expansion of the franchise to the 
general public. Democracy was long held in suspicion, and as we saw with Rousseau, it 
returned to intellectual consciousness in a more local form, distinct from the mass-
democracy we know today and which would only take hold in the 20th century, with the 
exception of America, Britain and France.  
 There were several problems associated with democracy among its many 
sceptics at the time, but we are only interested in the two related to our project. These 
two concerned the redistribution of wealth and the protection of minorities. What unites 
the two problems are their derivation from populism or a form of tyranny of the 
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majority that so concerned 18th and 19th century liberal and conservative thinkers. Both 
problems are even more relevant for Chua's findings, which we shall expound on in the 
following paragraphs.  
 
1. 3. 1. Markets and Democracy 
 
Among Enlightenment thinkers of a liberal kind, it was assumed that the popular vote 
would translate into a self-aggrandizement from the public purse. Rousseau, as we saw, 
wanted a uniform and economically equal polity for this reason because great 
inequalities would inevitably translate into political battles over societal wealth. The 
fear was also that it would harm the rule of law and the protection of private property, 
an institution that bad become widespread and ingrained in Western societies leading to 
an unprecedented creation of wealth that set the West apart from the rest of the globe 
(Pomeranz 2001; McCloskey 2010). 
 Not to mention that social and economic elites had the most to lose from a social 
and political revolution. So it was to be expected that elites at the time were hesitant, at 
best, towards expanding the voting franchise. For the great classical liberal Adam Smith 
it was only natural that "for one very rich man, there must be at least five hundred 
poor." But, as Amy Chua notes when discussing Smith, the affluence of the rich excites 
the indignation of the poor, who are often both driven by want, and prompted by envy, 
to invade his possessions (Chua 2003, 186). 
 For David Ricardo, another classical political economist, the vote could only be 
extended to those who themselves had property and as such would have an interest in 
preserving it (Chua 2003, 186). Even into the 20th century the liberal economist Vilfredo 
Pareto never accepted democracy as compatible with liberalism and sought refuge in 
autocracy and fascism by the end of his life (Finer 1968). 
 In Britain the liberal statesmen Thomas Babington Macaulay was even harsher in 
his critique. According to Macaulay the popular vote was incompatible with civilization 
itself and that the natural inequality of wealth distribution would lead to "one vast 
spoliation" (Chua 2003, 186). In the 19th century, after Britain had begun to expand the 
vote, the popular writer and intellectual Walter Bagehot wrote The English Constitution 
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(1867) in order to educate the new masses coming into democracy, but campaigned 
bitterly against its further expansion seeking to limit it on a property basis for towns 
with a population over 70,000 (Lerner 1968). 
 Democratic scepticism was not merely an Anglophone enterprise but even 
extended to French liberal republicans. The French writer and historian Alexis de 
Tocqueville marvelled at the democratic experiment in America. Despite his advocacy of 
democracy he saw in it a potential for a new kind of despotism that would be milder but 
far-reaching. "This same principle of equality which facilitates despotism tempers its 
rigor. We have seen how the customs of society become more humane and gentle in 
proportion as men become more equal and alike. When no member of the community 
has much power or much wealth, tyranny is, as it were, without opportunities and a field 
of action. As all fortunes are scanty, the passions of men are naturally circumscribed, 
their imagination limited, their pleasures simple" (Tocqueville 1840, 258). 
 In fact, the founding fathers of America feared democracy immensely and 
constructed elaborate checks and balances against it. Contrary to popular belief, the 
word democracy does not appear in the American constitution at all, despite all of 
populist sentiment associated with the American Revolution. Their founders had seen 
the fate of ancient democratic Greece and feared the same for America. The American 
system did have democratic features that would be expanded in the 19th century, but it 
was originally intended to be a liberal and republican system that guarded natural rights 
which were not to be negotiated by the political system (Hamilton et al. 1788). 
 As Chua explains, the fears were grossly overstated, but only because democracy 
and markets would both eventually be compromised. Beginning with Bismarck's welfare 
state in the 19th century, it was possible to align mass-democracy with the rule of law 
and capitalism without turning the system into widespread factionalism that would only 
have served to redistribute wealth to majority groups. This was contested in democratic 
systems, but gradually worked out over time without great revolts and shocks to the 
political and economic institutions (Chua 2003, 190). 
 Chua points out that it is exactly this history that has been conveniently forgotten 
in the neoliberal era of development. Since the Western model could only overcome 
these problems over time it is only reasonable that the same would be true in the 
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underdeveloped world. According to Chua the encouragement, and in some cases 
imposition, of the laissez faire model with democracy is more likely to endanger the 
political and economic system in the way that previous liberal thinks imagined (Chua 
2003, 21). Furthermore, she argues that it would hurt ethnic minorities and especially 
the economically dominant ones - "in other words, today's universal policy prescription 
for underdevelopment, shaped and promulgated to a large extent by the United States, 
essentially amounts to this. Take the rawest form of capitalism, slap it together with the 
rawest form of democracy, and export the two as a package deal to the poorest, most 
frustrated, most unstable, and most desperate countries of the world. Add market-
dominant minorities to the picture, and the instability inherent in this bare-knuckle 
version of free market democracy is compounded a thousandfold by the manipulable 
forces of ethnic hatred" (Chua 2003, 190). 
 
1. 3. 2. Ethnic Minorities, Democracy and Globalization 
 
As democracy and markets became compatible during the 20th century the problem of 
ethnic diversity was forgotten. We will argue later in the discussion that the two World 
Wars changed the composition of Western states so that they became more ethnically 
homogenous. Before turning to the case of market dominant minorities we will briefly 
touch on this issue.  
 In the interwar period German, Austrian, Russian and Turkish empires were 
dethroned with democracies arising in the former two. The case of the former Austrian-
Hungarian empire is instructive to the case that we are arguing for in this project. Under 
the auspices of the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations, democratic regimes 
were erected in very diverse societies. One of the widely stated failures of the League of 
Nations was its inability to protect the minority populations that were suddenly at the 
thrall of newly empowered ethnic majorities. As historian Paul Johnson recounts, the 
new nation-states in Central Europe turned out to be far more callous towards 
minorities than the former monarchies and empires that preceded them. "Elections 
were suspect, and the railways, the banking system and the principles of internal free 
trade were savagely disrupted in the pursuit of racial advantage immediately any reform 
made such action possible. No ethnic group behaved consistently. What the Germans 
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demanded and the Czechs refused in Bohemia, the Germans refused and the Italians and 
South Slavs demanded in South Tyrol and Styria. All the various Diets and Parliaments, 
in Budapest, Prague, Graz and Innsbruck, were arenas of merciless racial discord… Each 
local government, from which minorities were excluded, protected its home industries 
where it was legally empowered to do so, and if not, organized boycotts of goods made 
by other racial groups" (Johnson 1992, 37; Mazower 2004). 
 The contemporary situation in the Middle East is further evidence of this popular 
sentiment expressing itself in a particularly hostile fashion towards ethnic and religious 
minorities. It is no surprise that in the cases of Egypt, Iraq and Syria the minorities most 
at risk were some of the biggest supporters of the previous autocrats because they 
feared the Muslim majorities would turn against them. This has since come to pass with 
ancient Christian communities giving way to the chauvinism of the politically 
empowered Muslim majorities (Russell 2013). 
 As documented, these events would not have surprised the old sceptical critics of 
democracy. The potency of diversity in democratic settings has been explored in 
previous pages and serves as the background to our first research hypothesis. Chua's 
argumentation is an innovative and special case of the ethnic problem writ large. What 
she argues in her book is that certain minorities tend to economically outperform every 
other ethnic group. She calls them market-dominant minorities and traces them to all 
parts of the globe describing the brutal efforts of aggrieved ethnic majorities against 
them.  
 In our project we focus on Southeast Asia and its Chinese minorities as a case 
example. Elsewhere, they include Jews in Russia, Lebanese in West Africa, Indians in 
East Africa and Europeans in Latin America (to name just a few of the cases). Besides 
democracy and markets, her story incorporates globalization, dramatic increase and 
acceleration of trade flows, foreign investment, marketization and socio-cultural 
proximity, as an important engine in worsening ethnic relations. As the market-
dominant minorities benefit disparately from all market liberalization, the market 
economy and the wealth it produces quickly become associated with the those 
particular ethnic groups. As a result the political system becomes imbued in racial or 
ethnic politics.  
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 One of Chua's main contributions is to reinterpret past attempts at 
nationalizations and expropriations as being driven by nationalist and ethnic impulses 
rather than socialist ones. She argues that, in the aftermath of the Cold War's end, the 
subsequent privatization programs in the Third World were interpreted as lessons 
learned from the failure of the communist experiment. She argues that this is mistaken 
and that many past nationalizations, especially in Southeast Asia and Latin America, 
were a reaction to the ethnic identity of holders of capital. Apart from those that came 
outrightly in the name of socialism and communism, Cuba and Vietnam, the 
nationalizations were often targeted towards certain industries. In some of the cases she 
recounts the market-dominant minorities owning up to 80% of the economy which 
greatly provokes the ethnic majorities that then demand something be done to rectify 
this injustice.  
 More often than not, these economic inequalities are interpreted as being caused 
by the market-dominant minority's abhorrent behaviour or simply being unjust in the 
light of the widespread poverty of the dominant ethnic groups. Rather than being a post-
Cold War phenomenon, Southeast Asia and Latin America had long been following 
nationalization-privatization cycles: "the privatization-nationalization cycle cannot be 
understood without recognizing this fundamental tension between the forces of the 
marketplace and the forces of ethnic division" (Chua 1995, 5). Hence, Chua pushes back 
on the popular idea among global policymakers in the 1990s that nationalizations would 
now be a thing of the past. It is more widely known that populist politicians in 
developing countries would rally the public against foreign holders of capital. Chua adds 
that this view is held of the market-dominant minorities as well. It is in this light that she 
refers to them as the foreigners within (Chua 1995, 5).  
 The reactions against the market-dominant minorities are not merely economic, 
but include other forms of discrimination. In the case of Southeast Asia, the Chinese are 
discriminated against by the weakening of civil rights, citizenship, educational 
opportunities and language requirements (Minority Rights Group International 1992). 
In more severe cases the ethnic majorities are enabled to employ violence against them 
with few repercussions. The vicious riots in Indonesia in 1998 were a vindication of 
Chua's sceptical view of the progress that globalization would inevitably bring. The 
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Chinese were heavily targeted by the Indonesian native pribumi, sons of the land, with 
many casualties and forced emigrations as direct consequences. 
 In reaction to the Southeast Asian financial crisis, the Indonesian government 
embarked on a huge nationalization spree covering many big and important industries 
and kept them on the government books. One of the reasons for the reluctant 
reprivatizations was the pervasive dread that ethnic Chinese and other foreigners would 
swoop in like vultures to carry off the nation's resources and lead to an even greater 
concentration of wealth in the Chinese minority. The riots were caused by the fall of the 
Indonesian autocrat Suharto. The sequences of events underscore another of Chua’s 
points. The Chinese had had a relatively stable relationship with Suharto and he 
benefitted from their economic dominance by partnering with select cronies. This led to 
the widespread perception that the Chinese majority were cohorts of the repressive 
regime and only inflamed the anti-Chinese sentiment among the ethnic majority (Chua 
2003, 47). This pattern of relatively tolerant autocrats, prospering off of the market-
dominant minorities while protecting them from the public wrath, is a recurring theme 
in Chua's work. 
 In the final sub-section of this chapter we use the outlined intellectual 
background and the issues discussed so far to address the relevance of our research 
hypotheses to Southeast Asia and the methodological tools we have chosen to pursue 
our hypotheses. 
 
1. 4. Relevance of Methodology and Choice of Research Subject 
 
In her work Amy Chua tries to fit her model of ethnic conflict to every part of the world 
and to explain international relations and the hostilities towards the West by 
characterizing it as a market dominant minority on the global level. Rather than try to fit 
her model on a new case, we have instead tried to examine it quantitatively since she 
heavily relies on anecdotal evidence in putting her thesis forward. If her claims are true, 
it should be possible to capture some of the conflicts and dynamics that the presence of 
market-dominant minorities cause in a country. For this reason we have decided to look 
into whether it holds that market-dominant minorities will be subject to discrimination, 
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how their presence affects the political and economic system of a country and how this 
plays in with the level of globalization.  
 In order to give her model the best possible conditions we have chosen to focus 
on Southeast Asia for two reasons. Southeast Asia has a clear market dominant minority 
in the Chinese, whose economic dominance is rather obvious. Chua developed her global 
thesis of market-dominant minorities from the Southeast Asian experience with the 
Chinese minority. In order to properly test Chua's thesis it would stand to reason that if 
it cannot withstand empirical scrutiny in the best settings, the entire theory has to be 
amended or rejected. 
 In our first research hypothesis we wish to test whether or not ethnically diverse 
countries lead to relatively splintered societies with resultant ethnic conflict and a 
dysfunctional political and economic order. Southeast Asia is a multiethnic region with 
more than just the Chinese minority. Additionally, it has fluctuated between different 
types of regimes since most of the countries obtained independence after the post-
World War Two decolonization process. For this reason Southeast Asia should serve as a 
good example for testing the hypothesis that countries adopting democratic practices, 
namely political competition leading to majoritarian rule, are more prone to ethnic 
conflict and discrimination in the context of globalization.  
 Given that the region in question has been conflict ridden for a long time it would 
be particularly useful to examine if ethnic diversity has been understated as a cause of 
underdevelopment and conflict. Chua's thesis is quite innovative and has not been 
subjected to extensive testing. Her own personal experiences in the development world 
fuelled her thinking and as such it would be a contribution if the role of market-
dominant minorities had been overlooked and therefore underestimated in 
development efforts. Hence, our second hypothesis tests the notion that the Chinese 
market-dominant minorities in Southeast Asia are more likely to be discriminated 
against in countries adopting more democratic procedures and endorsing the global free 
market. 
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1. 4. 1. Possible Problems with Data Collection 
 
While our first hypothesis should be straightforward, the indicators of the second 
hypothesis can be somewhat harder to measure. One tale from Chua's own life 
illustrates the elusiveness of some of the ethnic hostilities. After her Sino-Philippine aunt 
had been killed by a Philippine driver, Chua found the Philippine police totally apathetic 
and disinterested in arresting the killer despite all the existing evidence and witnesses. 
The lacklustre policing stems from the hatred towards the Chinese and, therefore, her 
Chinese family are unsurprised at the lack of effort from the police (Chua 2003, 9). 
 The story Chua tells is a perfect illustration of how the incendiary nature of ethnic 
hostilities plays out for the Chinese minority. The government is not actively killing or 
obstructing, but nor are they providing justice for the hated minority. For this reason the 
Chinese in the Philippines and other Southeast Asian countries live closer to the 
anarchic side of the spectrum of equal justice compared to the ethnic majority. For this 
reason the Chinese provide for their own security by relocating away in gated 
communities, far away from the hostile native population.  This indifference from the 
authorities can take many forms, but it can be very hard to quantify and as such we will 
inevitably miss this crucial part of the picture. The welfare of the Chinese is therefore 
subject to social costs that are unfairly burdened on them. A similar story is told by Chua 
of the white elites in Latin America and not surprisingly the issue of security is a 
recurring theme in her book (Chua 2003, 52-78). 
 Another subtlety that will be hard to capture is a regime that will show mixed 
attitudes towards the Chinese. The example of Suharto is instructive here. From the 
beginning he would placate the anti-Chinese sentiment in the public by forms of 
discrimination, but would also ban newspapers that spoke too critically of the Chinese. 
In some cases an autocrat may have mixed feelings towards the Chinese, or like Suharto, 
attempt to feed the frenzied public. Chua even gives examples of autocrats that ride anti-
market-dominant minority sentiment to power only to switch position and curry 
favours of those groups in attempts to fend off political rivals or simply to enrich 
themselves. For these reasons we are attempting to find the best approximate indicators 
of the dynamics Chua describes. 
 
Page 25 of 86 
 
1. 4. 2. What We Expect to Find 
 
For the first hypothesis we expect to find that ethnically diverse countries would face 
more challenges in establishing peaceful and stable democratic systems and practices. 
Economic resources should also be subject to ethnic struggles, so conflicts in ethnically 
diverse countries embracing democracy and globalization should be more frequent and 
intense. And we should find that autocratic regimes are more able to contain the effects 
of ethnic hostilities and that democracies are more prone to become instruments of 
ethnic nepotism and discrimination. 
 For our second research hypothesis we should find that the Chinese influence will 
stand in the data and that their wealth is likely to fluctuate along with the type of regime 
in place. Furthermore, we expect to see greater discrimination under democratic 
regimes when the majorities can legislate their resentment towards the market-
dominant minority. The level of globalization should also be a predictor since it is tied to 
the expanding wealth of the Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia and the resultant 
resentment of the politically dominant ethnic majorities. 
 
1. 5. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we have examined some of the ideas and thinkers who have inspired our 
assumptions regarding the problems of ethnically heterogeneous polities. We have tried 
to show this through a theoretical section with the ideas of Plato and Rousseau and with 
a historical section that highlights forgotten scepticism towards mass-democracy in the 
West. We have also raised the problem of ethnic nepotism and its causes and effects on 
societies past and present.  Finally, everything was brought together in the discussion on 
Amy Chua's findings on market-dominant minorities where we offered our two research 
hypotheses. 
 In the next chapter we will explain how we have tried to incorporate the ideas 
and assumptions in a quantifiable manner in order to collect data necessary for 
operationalization and testing of both of our research hypotheses. 
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II Data Collection and Methodology  
 
2. 1. Introduction 
 
In the following chapter we aim to present the methodological choices we have made 
pursuing the research queries of this project and to bring closer the manner in which we 
operationalized our hypotheses. The first sub-section serves to explain how we 
completed our research dataset. We shall argue for our choices of data sources and 
describe the content of our variables. In the second sub-section we address how we 
intend to test our hypotheses using the constructed research variables. Finally, in the 
third sub-section additional attention is given to the specific statistical methods of 
analysis we wish to employ in order to accept or reject our hypotheses, namely the 
Pearson's correlation coefficient and the multiple linear regression model. 
 By doing so we hope to offer a detailed overview not just of our data collection 
and data analysis process, but of the way in which we have used the research variables 
in examining the relations between our main research concepts - democracy, 
globalization, internal ethnic conflict and the Chinese as the market-dominant minority 
in Southeast Asia. 
 
2. 2. Research Dataset 
 
Our research dataset covers nine Southeast Asian countries (here Vietnam is counted 
once, although we included data both for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the 
Republic of Vietnam before their unification in 1976). We composed a year-by-year 
country-level dataset, starting in 1945 for Thailand, the only country whose political 
sovereignty reaches back before the Second World War, and ending in 2013. Data for 
other countries start in the first years of their independence (chronologically, for the 
Philippines in 1945, for Myanmar (Burma) in 1948, Indonesia in 1949, Cambodia in 
1953, Laos and Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1954, Republic of Vietnam in 1955, 
Malaysia in 1957, Singapore in 1959 and the unified Vietnam in 1976).   
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 The dataset consists of 61 variables which can easily be classified into five 
distinct types. The first group, including 25 of our dataset's variables, refers to 
democracy. To indicate the level of implementation of democratic practices in Southeast 
Asian countries and the nature of their regimes we used 23 variables from the widely 
known Polity IV Individual Country Regime Trends (1946-2013) database completed by 
M. G. Marshall and T. R. Gurr of the Centre for Systemic Peace (2014).  
 The most important variable, and the one we are going to rely on the most, is 
polity2, describing the nature of a country's regime, ranging from -10 (very autocratic) 
to +10 (very democratic) (Marshall and Gurr 2014, 17). Another important variable is 
democ (Democracy Score), ranging from 0 to 10, followed by a group of component and 
concept variables assessing a country's levels of political competition, constraints placed 
upon the executive branch of government and the manner in which the executive 
authority is being recruited. We shall use polity2 in combination with a number of other 
Polity IV Project variables to indicate the nature of political regimes in Southeast Asia. 
 The last two of the variables belonging to the first cluster are based upon the 
Freedom House's Individual Country Ratings and Status database, expressing the levels 
of political rights and civil liberties in Southeast Asian countries (from 0 to 7, where 0 is 
"the worst of the worst", and 7 "free") in the period 1973-2013 (Freedom House 2015). 
Unfortunately, there is no data available for the earlier, pre-1973 period. Therefore, we 
shall use these two variables only as supporting evidence to test the robustness of our 
data on the strength of democracy. 
 The second group of our variables attempts at proxying globalization. As far as 
we could detect, there is no available data on general levels of globalization following 
the end of World War Two. Thus, we decided to use the KOF Globalization Index 
measuring the three main dimensions of globalization (economic, social and political) in 
the period 1970-2012, developed by the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich 
(Dreher, Gaston and Martens 2008). The KOF's dataset also provides aggregate data on 
globalization, combining the mentioned three dimensions.  
 Even though KOF's index does not cover the entire period we are striving to 
analyze, we decided to use it as the best available collection of data on globalization. To 
make up for such weakness, we constructed two additional variables in order to indicate 
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the economic changes taking effect in Southeast Asia in the whole studied period. Hence 
the use of the gross domestic product per capita growth rates for the period 1945-2013 
we computed and calculated after having them extracted from three different sources - 
the Maddison Project, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
and the World Bank (Bolt and van Zanden 2014; UNCTAD Stat 2014; World Bank Data 
2015).  
 Ultimately, and to serve the same purpose, we shall take into account one more 
variable on gross domestic product per capita in absolute numbers for the period 1945-
1999, constructed by J. D. Fearon and  D. D. Laitin for their work on ethnicity, civil war 
and insurgency (2003). Relying on the aggregate globalization scores provided by the 
KOF's Index and the gross domestic product per capita growth rates and its absolute 
amounts we strive to determine the direction of economic changes brought about by 
globalization in Southeast Asia.  
 The next cluster, composed of 19 variables, exposes the levels of ethnic conflict 
and ethnic discrimination. The fact that there is no single database on incidences and 
intensity of ethnic violence is confirmed by other authors as well (Bezemer and Jong-A-
Pin 2013, 113). However, we tried to reach satisfactory indicators of general levels of 
ethnic conflict in Southeast Asia after 1945 by consulting a number of existing sources 
covering different aspects of ethnic politics.  
 The Systemic Peace Research Project and its Major Episodes of Political Violence 
(1946-2013) database provided us with data on magnitude of ethnic violence, ethnic 
war and societal conflict (Marshall 2014). We managed to locate data on cumulative 
internal and internationalized internal conflict intensity levels owing to the joint 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program/International Peace Research Institute Oslo dataset 
(Gleditsch et al. 2002). The Minorities at Risk database, completed within a University of 
Maryland's research project, served as a source for data on the average annual levels of 
political and economic discrimination against minority groups in the period 1950-2006. 
The same source enabled us to collect data and construct variables on the number of 
discriminated groups per country and the levels of economic differentials between 
ethnic groups in power and minority groups (Minorities at Risk Project 2009).  
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 In addition, we used the Geographical Research On War Unified Platform 
(Institute of Technology Zurich) to extract data and construct variables on the number 
of excluded and discriminated groups and the proportions of their populations in 
Southeast Asian countries in the period 1946-2013. This database also helped us 
identify new onsets of ethnic conflict in the region (Girardin et al. 2015).  
 Moreover, we constructed an additional variable on armed ethnic conflict levels 
(1946-2010) using the Ethnic Power Relations database produced by a research team of 
the University of California, Los Angeles (Wimmer, Cederman and Min 2009). Finally, we 
decided to add two more variables on ethnic fractionalization (1945-1999), developed 
by J. D. Fearon and  D. D. Laitin (2003), and the number of deaths in four Southeast Asian 
countries' ethnic conflicts since 1985, estimated by Susan Olzak in her work on 
globalization and ethnic discontent (2011). By assembling such a broad database on 
ethnic conflict and intolerance we wished to generate as precise an estimation as 
possible of general levels of inter-group violence and discrimination in Southeast Asia 
after 1945. This should enable clear and straightforward testing of our first research 
hypothesis.   
 The fourth group of variables addresses the condition of the Chinese market-
dominant minority in Southeast Asia. Relying on three databases that we have 
previously explored, namely Minorities at Risk, Ethnic Power Relations and 
Geographical Research On War Unified Platform, we managed to develop six variables 
depicting the levels of economic and political discrimination against the Chinese 
ethnicity and its economic position vis-à-vis other ethnic groups, including the politically 
dominant ethnic majorities in the region (Minorities at Risk Project 2009; Wimmer, 
Cederman and Min 2009; Girardin et al. 2015). We did so to indicate the peculiar 
position of the Chinese ethnic groups across Southeast Asian countries and to render a 
meaningful statistical analysis leading to confirmation or rejection of our second 
hypothesis possible. 
 Lastly, the fifth group encompasses a number of computed variables created to 
facilitate simpler statistical processing. Our variable E* measures the aggregate levels of 
ethnic conflict, combining 9 other variables both on ethnic conflict and discrimination 
from the dataset. Variable E*2 strives to do the same, although here, in order to decrease 
the number of missing values and focus only on (armed) conflict, we summed up seven 
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out of nine of the initial variables and excluded the indicators of political and economic 
discrimination from the Minorities at Risk database that cover the period 1950-2006.  
Table 1. Variables E*2 and E* - missing values. 
 
 Furthermore, variable EC* measures the aggregate levels of political and 
economic discrimination against the Chinese ethnic minority in the region. It represents 
a sum of three other variables from the already described fourth cluster. Unfortunately, 
we were not able to track any quantitative data on outbreaks of violence against the 
Chinese ethnic groups and, therefore, had to place our confidence in the collected data 
on discrimination. 
 Subsequently, the variable C* measures the level of economic dominance of the 
Chinese market-dominant minority in Southeast Asia. To create such an important 
variable, we were forced to quantify qualitative, historical data. We mostly relied on 
Chua's overview offered in World on Fire (2003, 23-48, 151-157, and 177-185) and the 
1992 Minority Rights Group International's report on the position of the Chinese in 
Southeast Asia (pp. 12-34), although we also considered a series of fragmented 
academic and news reports covering either individual countries, shorter periods of time 
or both. We devised a system that assigns values according to principles exposed in the 
following table. To the best of our knowledge, there is no existing database that covers 
this particular subject.  
 
0 the Chinese minority is under severe political and economic persecution, including 
expulsion and physical violence 
1 the Chinese minority occupies an economic position proportionate to its share of the 
total population 
 
 E*2 - Aggregate Level of 
Ethnic Conflict (SUM of Vs 29, 
30, 33, 36, 38, 44 and 45) - 
less missing values 
E* - Aggregate Level of 
Ethnic Conflict (SUM of Vs 
29, 30, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 44 
and 45) 
N 
Valid 565 457 
Missing 23 131 
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2 the Chinese minority controls less than 20% of the economy 
3 the Chinese minority controls between 21% and 50% of the economy 
4 the Chinese minority controls more than 51% of the economy 
Table 2. Variable C* - coding system.  
 
 After having completed the general overview of the research dataset, we are now 
ready to move on to the next sub-section where we explain how our variables shall be 
used to operationalize the research hypotheses and empower their verification. Before 
doing so and concluding the current sub-section, we offer a table presenting all of our 
variables with the numbers of their valid and missing values (the entire dataset is to be 
found in Annex II). 
 
 1. Country 2. Year 3. Democracy Score 4. Autocracy Score 5. Polity Score 
N 
Valid 588 588 537 588 588 
Missing 0 0 51 0 0 
 
 6. Polity2 Score 7. Duration of 
Regime 
8. Component 
Variable: Chief 
Executive 
Recruitment 
9. Component 
Variable: 
Competitiveness 
of Executive 
Recruitment 
10. Component 
Variable: Openness 
of Executive 
Recruitment 
N 
Valid 569 588 588 588 588 
Missing 19 0 0 0 0 
 
 11. Component 
Variable: Executive 
Constraints 
12. Component 
Variable: 
Regulation of 
Participation 
13. Component 
Variable: 
Competitiveness of 
Participation 
14. Concept 
Variables: 
Executive 
Recruitment 
(xrreg+xrcomp+xr
open) 
15. Concept 
Variables: Executive 
Constraints (xconst) 
N 
Valid 588 588 588 537 537 
Missing 0 0 0 51 51 
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 16. Concept 
Variables: Political 
Competition 
(parreg+parcomp) 
17. Polity End 
Month 
18. Polity End Day 19. Polity End Year 20. Polity Begin 
Month 
N 
Valid 537 73 73 73 58 
Missing 51 515 515 515 530 
 
 21. Polity Begin 
Day 
22. Polity Begin 
Year 
23. State Failure 24. Freedom House 
Political Rights 
Score 1972-2013 
25. Freedom House 
Civil Liberties 
Score 1972-2013 
N 
Valid 58 58 15 382 382 
Missing 530 530 573 206 206 
 
 26. GDP Per Capita 
Growth Rates - 
Maddison + 
UNCTAD + World 
Bank 
27. GDP Per Capita 
Absolute - 
Ethnicity, 
Insurgency and 
Civil War (in 1000s 
USD85) 
28. Average 
Economic 
Differentials: 
EGIP:MEG, 
ECDIFXX 
MAR/Group-Level 
(inv, 1-7, lower 
value, lower the 
status) 
29. Magnitude of 
Ethnic Violence - 
MEPV 2014 
30. Magnitude of 
Ethnic War - MEPV 
2014 
N 
Valid 558 426 254 566 566 
Missing 30 162 334 22 22 
 
 31. Magnitude of 
Societal Conflict 
(CIVTOT) - MEPV 
2014 
32. Cumulative 
Internal and 
Internationalized 
Internal Conflict 
Intensity Level - 
PRIO/Uppsala 
2014 
33. Armed Ethnic 
Conflict - Ethnic 
Power Relations 
ver. 3.01 
34. Average 
Political 
Discrimination 
Against Minorities 
Per Year - MAR 
Discrimination 
Dataset 
35. Average 
Economic 
Discrimination 
Against Minorities 
Per Year - MAR 
Discrimination 
Dataset 
N 
Valid 566 588 588 464 464 
Missing 22 0 0 124 124 
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 36. Onset of New 
Ethnic Conflict(s) 
0-1 - GrowUp 
37. No. of Deaths in 
Ethnic Conflict - 4 
countries from 
1985 - Susan Olzak 
38. Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
Index - Ethnicity, 
Insurgency and 
Civil War 
39. No. of 
Discriminated 
Groups 1950-2006 
(MAR) 
40. No. of Excluded 
Groups (GrowUp) 
N 
Valid 575 72 588 464 574 
Missing 13 516 0 124 14 
 
 41. No. of Ethnic 
Groups in Power 
(GrowUp) 
42. No. of 
Discriminated 
Groups (MAR) / 
No. Excluded 
Groups (if 0, then 
1) (GrowUp) 
43. No. of 
Discriminated 
Groups (MAR) / 
No. of Ethnically 
Relevant Groups 
(GrowUp) 
44. No. of Excluded 
Groups (GrowUp) 
/ No. of Ethnically 
Relevant Groups 
(GrowUp) 
45. Percentage of 
Discriminated 
Population 
(GrowUp) 
N 
Valid 574 457 457 574 574 
Missing 14 131 131 14 14 
 
 46. Percentage of 
Excluded 
Population 
(GrowUp) 
47. Level of 
Economic 
Globalization 
1970-2012 (KOF 
Zurich)  *Actual 
Flows used as a 
proxy for Laos 
48. Level of Social 
Globalization 
1970-2012 (KOF 
Zurich) 
49. Level of 
Political 
Globalization 
1970-2012 (KOF 
Zurich) 
50. Aggregate 
Level of 
Globalization 
1970-2012 (KOF 
Zurich) 
N 
Valid 574 388 388 388 388 
Missing 14 200 200 200 200 
 
 51. General Status 
of the Chinese 
Minority in South 
East Asian 
Countries 1-7 
(GrowUp Group-
Level)  *99 n.p, 88 
null 
52. Binary Flag - 
Discrimination 
Against the 
Chinese 0-1 (EPR) 
53. Political 
Discrimination 
Against the Chinese 
(where present) - 
MAR Discrimination 
Dataset 
54. Economic 
Discrimination 
Against the 
Chinese (where 
present) - MAR 
Discrimination 
Dataset 
55. Economic 
Position of the 
Chinese in South East 
Asian Countries - 
ECDIFXX 
MAR/Group-Level 
(inverted, 1-7) *99 
n.p. 
N 
Valid 478 558 464 464 119 
Missing 110 30 124 124 469 
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 56. EC* - Aggregate Discrimination Against the Chinese 
(SUM of Vs 52, 53 and 54) 
N 
Valid 464 
Missing 124 
 
 57. Economic 
Position of the 
Chinese in South 
East Asia vis-à-vis 
Other Minorities 
(V54minusV28) 
*99 n.p. 
58. MDM* - 
Presence of an 
MDM according to 
MAR 0-1 
59. C* - Measure of 
Chinese Market 
Dominance in 
South East Asia 
(based on Chua 
and other sources) 
60. E* - Aggregate 
Level of Ethnic 
Conflict (SUM of Vs 
29, 30, 33, 34, 35, 
36, 38, 44 and 45) 
61. E*2 - Aggregate 
Level of Ethnic 
Conflict (SUM of Vs 
29, 30, 33, 36, 38, 
44 and 45) - less 
missing values 
N 
Valid 119 588 587 457 565 
Missing 469 0 1 131 23 
 
Table 3. All variables with the numbers of valid and missing values. 
 
2. 2. Operationalization of Research Hypotheses 
 
Before designating the statistical methods we are to use to test our starting assumptions, 
we wish to elaborate on the ways in which the outlined research variables are employed 
to operationalize the two hypotheses of this research project. We shall start by reporting 
on the operationalization of our first research hypothesis, namely that adoption of more 
democratic practices and more free-market-endorsing globalization led to higher levels 
of internal ethnic conflict in nine Southeast Asian countries in the period 1945-2013. 
After having done so, we will attribute attention to the operationalization of our second 
research hypothesis which puts forward the claim that the Chinese ethnic minorities, as 
market-dominant minorities in Southeast Asia, were and are discriminated against more 
severely under democratic regimes favouring free market globalization in the same 
studied period.  
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2. 2. 1. The First Research Hypothesis 
 
Our first research hypothesis contains three separate segments - democracy, 
globalization and internal ethnic conflict. We shall determine how democratic a certain 
Southeast Asian regime is by relying on research variables from the first cluster 
described above. We assign special attention to the polity2 variable and the concept 
variables assessing the levels of openness of political competition, constraints placed 
upon the executive branch of government, preventing it from arbitrary abuse of power, 
and the manner in which the executive authority is being recruited under a political 
regime. We also make use of the variables indicating the levels of enforcement of 
political rights and civil liberties in Southeast Asian countries from 1973 to 2013. The 
higher the value all these variables display for a country in one year, the more 
democratic the nature of that country's political system.  
 To ascertain the extent to which a Southeast Asian country was affected by 
globalization, we use the variables from the second cluster. Apart from the variables 
expressing the levels of economic (incorporating trade flows, foreign investment, 
decreasing economic restrictions), social (information flows, cultural proximity), 
political (engagement in international politics) and aggregate level of globalization (the 
three combined) (Dreher, Gaston and Martens 2008), we are also going to use the 
variables indicating the gross domestic product per capita growth levels and absolute 
amounts. This is done under the general assumption that globalization indeed leads to 
increased economic activity and, therefore, growth.  
 Finally, to assess the levels of internal ethnic conflict in Southeast Asia in the 
period 1945-2013, we place our confidence in variables from the third group, adding to 
them the computed, and highly significant, E* and E*2 variables on aggregate levels of 
domestic internal conflict. Higher values of these variables indicate the existence of 
more intensive episodes of conflict among ethnic groups.  
 Consequently, to test our first research hypothesis, we intend to correlate the 
values from these three groups of variables. Simply put, identifying positive correlations 
between the levels of democracy and globalization, as independent variables on the one 
side, and domestic ethnic conflict, as dependent variable on the other, would enable us 
to accept our starting assumption and discuss its implications further in the project. 
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However, if we prove unable to identify such positive correlations, we shall mark our 
first hypothesis as unfounded and reject it.  
 
2. 2. 2. The Second Research Hypothesis 
 
In our second research hypothesis we focus on the condition of the Chinese ethnic 
minorities in eight out of nine Southeast Asian countries covered by this project. It is 
important to note here that we have decided to exclude Singapore from the research 
sample, for the Chinese actually constitute the dominant majority in that city-state off 
the southern end of the Malay Peninsula, accounting for 75% of the total population in 
2013 (Girardin et al. 2015). We hold a strong belief that holding on to the full research 
sample would strongly distort the outcome of our statistical analysis, since the Chinese 
ethnic group in Singapore cannot possibly be targeted by other groups due to their 
unquestionable political and economic predominance. Thus, including Singapore into 
our analysis would certainly elevate the average general status of the Chinese in the 
region and dim our judgement on this issue. 
 As our hypothesis brings forward a claim that the Chinese groups, owing to their 
economic supremacy vis-à-vis the ethnic majorities, are more likely to be discriminated 
against under regimes that allow for open political competition, generating majoritarian 
rule, and push for more free market policies in the context of globalization, we shall once 
more use the first two clusters of variables to indicate the levels of democracy and 
globalization in Southeast Asian countries in the studied period. But, instead of using the 
variables on the general levels of ethnic conflict and discrimination, here we employ the 
variables on the specific position of the Chinese ethnic groups across the region. 
 It is again worth noting that detailed data on the recurring acts and episodes of 
physical violence and maltreatment of the Chinese in the studied countries is virtually 
non-existent. As a result, we place our focus on political and economic discrimination 
only, and use the computed variable EC* to indicate their levels. The variable C* is used 
to determine the extent of market dominance performed by the Chinese minorities in 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam, 
all the countries which Amy Chua recognizes as economically dominated by Chinese 
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businesses and capital (2003, 23-48). Having determined the indicators for all segments 
of our second research hypothesis, we shall once more seek to establish positive 
correlations as measures of association between variables assessing the levels of 
democracy, globalization and the Chinese market dominance, on the one hand, and the 
severity of discrimination this ethnic minority is placed under across the region of 
Southeast Asia in the period 1945-2013.  
 Moreover, in an attempt to examine causal links between the most important 
research variables, we apply a multiple linear regression model based on the following 
equation: 
EC* = A + B₁ x GLOBALIZATION + B₂ x DEMOCRACY + B₃ x C*, 
where A is a constant value, B is the slope of the regression line, DEMOCRACY is 
represented by polity2 variable and GLOBALIZATION by our variable on the aggregate 
levels of globalization. By applying this model we wish to have the original causal thesis 
put forward by Amy Chua, building the core of our second research hypothesis, even 
more scrutinized.   
 After having conducted the described statistical analyses, we expect to identify 
positive correlation and regression coefficients between the four segments of our 
hypothesis, thus confirming that more democracy and globalization, when combined 
with the prominence of Chinese market domination, lead to more ethnically motivated 
discrimination against this Southeast Asian minority group. If that should not be the 
case, we shall reject the soundness of our second research hypothesis. 
 In the final sub-section of this chapter we bring forward the details of our 
statistical analytical methods. We argue that the correlation coefficient and multiple 
linear regression represent methodological tools powerful enough to enable the testing 
of this project's hypotheses.  
 
2. 3. Methods of Analysis 
 
Both correlation and regression fall under what is generally known as 'general linear 
modelling', a statistical method striving to depict the relationship between quantitative 
variables, whose codes represent true numeric values (scale variables) (Acton et al. 
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2009, 199). As all of the variables we intend to use fulfil this requirement, we shall carry 
out our analysis using the Pearson's product-moment correlation coefficient and a 
multiple linear regression model. The following paragraphs aim to explain how we plan 
to do so. 
 
2. 3. 1. Correlation Coefficient 
 
The Pearson's product-moment correlation coefficient (r) is a parametric test aiming to 
determine the existence of a real relationship between two scale variables, and then the 
direction of the relationship and its strength (Acton et al. 2009, 204). It is a powerful 
statistics that digests the direction and strength of correlation into a single number 
ranging from -1, the perfect negative correlation, to +1, the perfect positive correlation.  
 We shall use the twentieth version of IBM's SPSS software to test our variables 
for correlation, setting the statistical significance threshold (α) at 5%. In other words, 
we recognize as statistically relevant, and include in our results, only those correlations 
that display significance levels (p-value) lower than 0.05 (when α >p-value, then there is 
less than 5% chance that a correlation coefficient is based upon an error in sampling). 
Furthermore, as we have no presumptions about the direction of our correlations, we 
are going to choose the 'two-tailed' testing option in SPSS. 
 We have decided to take into consideration only those coefficients exhibiting 
correlations stronger than ± 0.30, accounting for at least 10% of linked variance in a 
correlation pair. Although we are fully aware of the fact that with the correlation 
coefficient one can only pursue significant relationships between variables, and not 
direct causality between them (Acton et al. 2009, 209), we hold that strong, statistically 
significant coefficients still offer enough evidence for judgement on the variables' 
interplay. Therefore, we shall use this particular method to test both of our hypotheses. 
 When testing the first research hypothesis, we do not seek establishment of 
causality per se; what we are after is a statement or statements on the general 
relationships between the variables in question, leading to complete acceptance or 
rejection of the hypothesis itself. However, the second hypothesis is greatly based on 
Amy Chua's confidently made claims that surmise causality between a number of 
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variables. That is why we have decided to add the multiple linear regression model as an 
additional analytical method to correlation coefficients when testing our second 
research hypothesis.  
 
2. 3. 2. Multiple Linear Regression 
 
Unlike the correlation statistics, linear regression models assume that an independent 
variable (x) is, at least in part, a cause or a predictor of the dependent variable(s) (y). 
Hence, regression allows researchers to test hypotheses in which causality is asserted 
(Acton et al. 2009, 209). Furthermore, linear regression is also a multivariate statistical 
method and can easily be extended to include more than one independent causal (x) 
variable. The extended (multiple) linear regression formula then takes the following 
form:  
y = a + b₁*x₁ + b₂*x₂ + ... + bn*xn, 
where each independent variable explains some of the variance in the dependent 
variable. Here a represents the constant value y would take if all independent variables 
had the value of 0, and b ('slope of the regression line' or 'regression coefficient') 
predicts the direction (positive/negative) and strength of change of y for every rise of 
one unit for x in question.  
 Three additional facts have to be considered here. Firstly, multiple linear 
regression models also mark the extent of statistical significance independent variables 
have upon y. This enables us to disregard all variables that do not exert significant effect 
on the dependent variable (p-value > 0.05). Moreover, with this method we shall be able 
to determine the relative importance of each x in accounting for variance in the chosen 
dependent variable. Secondly, and as common in quantitative studies in social sciences, 
we shall test our independent variables for colinearity and include the ANOVA test in 
our model summary. Finally, instead of only considering the unstandardized regression 
coefficients (b), we decided to take into account the standardized Beta coefficients as 
well (normally ranging from -1 to +1), also available in SPSS' statistical outputs, that 
place variables onto the same scale and make up for significantly different levels of 
values that independent variables may have (Acton et al. 2009, 218). In our case, this 
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assists in putting the aggregate globalization levels variable (with values 0-100) on the 
same scale as variables EC*, C* and polity2, all three having at least ten times lower 
values.  
 Consequently, by applying the multiple linear regression method we seek to 
establish the direct, relative influence every independent variable from our model has 
upon the levels of discrimination against the Chinese ethnic minorities in the eight 
Southeast Asian countries after 1945. We expect the regression model EC* = A + B₁ x 
GLOBALIZATION + B₂ x DEMOCRACY + B₃ x C* to strengthen the testing of our second 
hypothesis, going beyond correlation coefficients and showing even more clearly the 
influence of globalization, democracy and the Chinese market dominance upon our 
hypothesis' dependent variable EC*.  
 
2. 4. Conclusion 
 
We opened this chapter by showing how our research dataset was completed. The 
processes of data collection from various sources and construction of our research 
variables were both addressed. Thereafter, we took on operationalization of our two 
research hypotheses - it has been explained how we linked the research variables and 
the whole dataset with this project's most important claims. Lastly, we highlighted the 
particular statistical techniques we chose to employ when testing the two research 
hypotheses using the SPSS analytical software.  
 We regard the made methodological choices sufficient to potentiate an 
unambiguous, straightforward examination of our starting hypotheses. The next chapter 
shall present the entire body of our findings; there we offer an overview of our analyses' 
results and pass judgment upon the validity of the two research hypotheses. Moreover, 
we intend to use the next chapter to set the base for a wider closing discussion that shall 
exceed the outcomes of this project's hypothesis-testing and touch upon the general 
significance of ethnicity, ethnic conflict and ethnic politics in scientific deliberation on 
democracy and globalization. 
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III Analysis and Results 
 
3. 1. Introduction 
 
In the following chapter we shall focus on the most relevant results of our statistical 
analysis conducted in the IBM's SPSS software (the entire output is offered in Annex I). 
The first sub-section outlines the results within our first hypothesis, namely Pearson's 
product-moment correlation coefficients among variables expressing the general levels 
of democracy, globalization and domestic ethnic conflict in the nine Southeast Asian 
countries after 1945. The second sub-section deals with our second research hypothesis, 
presenting correlation and multiple linear regression coefficients from the analyses 
performed upon the eight countries from the research sample where we consider the 
Chinese groups as occupying the role of market-dominant minorities.  
 The objective of the third chapter is to clearly present this project's overall 
findings and to enable us to confidently accept or reject the two research hypotheses.  
 
3. 2. The First Research Hypothesis 
 
To test the first hypothesis we set out to analyze the entire research sample, correlating 
variables at the statistical significance threshold of 5%. Simply put, we wish to show that 
more democracy and globalization created favourable conditions for more internal 
ethnic conflict in Southeast Asia in the period 1945-2013.  
 We shall offer the findings on our independent variables separately, firstly 
addressing the significant correlations between democracy and domestic ethnic conflict 
and then between globalization and our dependent variable. Lastly, we shall pay some 
additional attention to the correlation between the independent variables themselves 
and conclude on the validity of our initial research claims. 
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3. 2. 1. Democracy and Internal Ethnic Conflict 
 
We have decided to correlate seven variables from our dataset's first cluster on 
democracy with four variables on ethnic discrimination and conflict. On the whole, we 
found that there is a weak to moderate negative correlation between these two groups 
of variables. Polity2 score is negatively correlated with the computed variable E*, the 
aggregate level of internal ethnic conflict, at -0.30. Introducing open and competitive 
executive recruitment also tends to decrease the aggregate levels of conflict (-0.34). 
Moreover, and following the conventional reasoning, greater protection of individual 
rights will lead to lower levels of internal ethnic conflict, as our two variables on 
enforcement of political rights and civil liberties show moderate negative correlations to 
computed variables E* and E*2, -0.44 and -0.45, and -0.41 and -0.40 respectively.  
 When it comes to ethnically motivated discrimination, there seems to exist a 
generally weak effect of non-autocratic regimes in containing it. In other words, we 
found that there is no telling correlation between polity2 and the general levels of 
political and economic discrimination against ethnic minorities (-0.19). The only 
variable assessing the procedural nature of a political regime that comes close to being 
weakly negatively correlated to ethnic discrimination is political competition at -0.30. 
Finally, the upholding of individual political rights and civil liberties is to bring down 
political (-0.36 and -0.37) and economic (-0.30 and -0.35) discrimination against ethnic 
minorities. 
 
Graph 1. Average levels of democracy (polity2) in Southeast Asia, 1945-2013.  
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 Polity2 Score E* - Aggregate Level of 
Ethnic Conflict (SUM of 
Vs 29, 30, 33, 34, 35, 36, 
38, 44 and 45) 
Polity2 Score 
Pearson Correlation 1 -,300** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000 
N 569 448 
E* - Aggregate Level of 
Ethnic Conflict (SUM of Vs 
29, 30, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 
44 and 45) 
Pearson Correlation -,300** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000  
N 448 457 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table 4. Correlation - democracy (polity2) and aggregate internal ethnic conflict (E*). 
 
3. 2. 2. Globalization and Internal Ethnic Conflict 
 
We have correlated six variables indicating levels of globalization with the same four 
variables from the previous section on internal ethnic conflict and discrimination. We 
are able to conclude that there is a moderate to strong negative correlation between the 
two groups of variables. Aggregate levels of globalization are negatively correlated both 
with E* and E*2 variables at -0.53 and -0.55. Furthermore, social globalization in 
particular, and relative to its political and economic form, has a strong effect upon 
decreasing levels of ethnic conflict (-0.57 for E*2 and -0.54 for E*, compared to -0.36/      
-0.40 and -0.47/-0.41 correlation coefficients of political and economic globalization and 
E*2 and E* respectively). Ultimately, gross domestic product per capita amounts that we 
decided to use as an additional proxy for globalization (and rightly so, for this variable is 
positively correlated with aggregate levels of globalization at 0.88) are also negatively 
correlated with E* and E*2 at -0.33 and -0.36.  
 In addition, we found that higher levels of economic globalization lead to a weak 
to moderate increase in average economic differentials between the dominant ethnic 
majorities and ethnic minority groups in Southeast Asia (-0.33), in some cases caused by 
discriminatory policies preventing minority members' access to higher education, 
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ownership of land or property, official posts and certain professions (Minorities at Risk 
Project 2009, 31-32).  
 Even though political globalization is negatively correlated with average political 
and economic ethnic discrimination (-0.33 and -0.30), the correlation coefficients 
between the aggregate levels of globalization, levels of economic and social 
globalization, on the one hand, and both types of discrimination against ethnic groups, 
on the other, are negligible in terms of strength, falling rather bellow our ±0.30 
threshold. Finally, we determined that growth of gross domestic product per capita also  
tends to lead to an increase of already mentioned economic differentials between the 
dominant and minority ethnic groups (-0.34).  
 
 
Graph 2. Average aggregate levels of globalization in Southeast Asia, 1970-2012. 
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 Aggregate 
Level of 
Globalization 
1970-2012 
(KOF Zurich) 
E* - Aggregate 
Level of Ethnic 
Conflict (SUM 
of Vs 29, 30, 
33, 34, 35, 36, 
38, 44 and 45) 
E*2 - 
Aggregate 
Level of Ethnic 
Conflict (SUM 
of Vs 29, 30, 
33, 36, 38, 44 
and 45) - less 
missing values 
Aggregate Level of 
Globalization 1970-2012 
(KOF Zurich) 
Pearson Correlation 1 -,526** -,551** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000 ,000 
N 388 327 387 
E* - Aggregate Level of 
Ethnic Conflict (SUM of Vs 
29, 30, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 
44 and 45) 
Pearson Correlation -,526** 1 ,965** 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000  ,000 
N 327 457 457 
E*2 - Aggregate Level of 
Ethnic Conflict (SUM of Vs 
29, 30, 33, 36, 38, 44 and 
45) - less missing values 
Pearson Correlation -,551** ,965** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000  
N 387 457 565 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table 5. Correlation - aggregate levels of globalization and internal ethnic conflict (E* 
and E*2). 
 
 
 GDP Per Capita 
Absolute - 
Ethnicity, 
Insurgency and 
Civil War (in 
1000s USD85) 
Level of 
Economic 
Globalization 
1970-2012 
(KOF Zurich)  
*Actual Flows 
used as a proxy 
for Laos 
Average 
Economic 
Differentials: 
EGIP:MEG, 
ECDIFXX 
MAR/Group-
Level (inv, 1-7, 
lower value, 
lower the 
status) 
GDP Per Capita Absolute - 
Ethnicity, Insurgency and 
Civil War (in 1000s 
USD85) 
Pearson Correlation 1 ,803** -,342** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
,000 ,000 
N 426 248 173 
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Level of Economic 
Globalization 1970-2012 
(KOF Zurich)  *Actual 
Flows used as a proxy for 
Laos 
Pearson Correlation ,803** 1 -,330** 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000  ,000 
N 248 388 223 
Average Economic 
Differentials: EGIP:MEG, 
ECDIFXX MAR/Group-
Level (inv, 1-7, lower 
value, lower the status) 
Pearson Correlation -,342** -,330** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000  
N 173 223 254 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table 6. Correlation - GDP per capita, economic globalization and economic differentials 
between majority and minority ethnic groups in Southeast Asia. 
 
3. 2. 3. Democracy and Globalization 
 
The last step we take before testing the general validity of our first research hypothesis 
is to correlate the two groups of independent variables on democracy and globalization. 
In short, the coefficients show moderate to strong positive correlations. The polity2 
variable is correlated with the aggregate levels of globalization at 0.54. Evidently, more 
democracy leads to more economic (0.40), political (0.62) and social (0.44) globalization 
as well. Accessible executive recruitment is more strongly correlated with aggregate 
globalization levels (0.69) than other two concept variables determining the democratic 
nature of political regimes, institutional constraints placed upon the executive authority 
(0.42) and levels of systemic political competition (0.40).  
 Besides, we noticed a clear tendency in the relation between variables on 
individual rights and globalization. Stronger protection of political rights and civil 
liberties is moderately to strongly correlated with higher aggregate levels of 
globalization (0.52 and 0.62). Furthermore, we found that political globalization has a 
stronger influence upon political rights and civil liberties when compared to economic 
and social globalization (0.61/0.73 to 0.35/0.46 and 0.44/0.52).  
 Finally, the levels of gross domestic product per capita are rather robustly 
positively correlated with globalization - 0.88 with the aggregate levels, 0.43 with 
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political, 0.92 with social and 0.80 with economic globalization. There can be no mistake 
about the fact that our data show that globalization helped generate economic growth in 
Southeast Asia. Additionally, growth of gross domestic product per capita is also 
positively correlated with variables on open executive recruitment and levels of political 
rights and civil liberties, at 0.37, 0.33 and 0.31 respectively.  
 
 Polity2 Score Aggregate Level of 
Globalization 1970-
2012 (KOF Zurich) 
Polity2 Score 
Pearson Correlation 1 ,539** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000 
N 569 379 
Aggregate Level of 
Globalization 1970-2012 
(KOF Zurich) 
Pearson Correlation ,539** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000  
N 379 388 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table 7. Correlation - democracy (polity2) and aggregate levels of globalization. 
 
3. 2. 4. Examination of the First Research Hypothesis 
 
Based on the correlation coefficients presented in this sub-section, we reject our first 
research hypothesis. We could not find enough evidence to accept the claim that posed 
that Southeast Asian regimes after 1945 were more prone to internal ethnic conflict and 
ethnic discrimination against ethnic minorities when implementing democratic 
practices and endorsing globalization.  
 Our data clearly demonstrate that there is no positive correlation between 
democracy and ethnic conflict and discrimination. As a matter of fact, we concluded that 
more democracy would tentatively lead to somewhat less contentious inter-ethnic 
relations in Southeast Asia (polity2 ↔ E*: -0.30). Although the negative correlation 
between the two groups of variables is not as strong as one might expect, that still does 
not allow us to accept our initial assumption. 
 In addition, our analysis has undoubtedly shown that there is no positive 
correlation between globalization and ethnic conflict and discrimination. Our data point 
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in a completely opposite direction - more globalization tends to lead to less inter-ethnic 
conflict and discrimination against minority ethnicities in the nine Southeast Asian 
countries from our sample (aggregate levels of globalization ↔ E*: -0.53).  
 It is certainly worth noting that the results we have come up with display slightly 
different negative correlation coefficients between democracy, globalization and 
internal (physical) ethnic conflict, on the one hand, and democracy, globalization and 
political and economic discrimination, on the other. Here we add another conclusion - 
although democracy and globalization incontrovertibly lead towards reduction of inter-
ethnic conflict (somewhat narrowly defined as armed, physical violence between 
dominant and minority ethnic groups), they do not seem to influence as strongly the 
practices and policies of economic and political discrimination against ethnic minorities 
in Southeast Asia. Apparently, discrimination could easily continue and exist in parallel, 
no matter regime changes or the levels of exposure to influences of economic, social 
and/or political globalization.  
 
 
Graph 3. Average levels of internal ethnic conflict and discrimination against ethnic 
minorities in Southeast Asia, 1950-2006.  
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 Finally, if we wanted to divide the studied period into major periodical trends 
and derive something from the three graphs offered in this sub-section depicting the 
average levels of the first hypothesis' two independent and one dependent variable, it is 
quite hard not to observe the fact that from the mid to late 1970s onwards there is a 
steady decline (with occasional setbacks) in levels of ethnic conflict and a clear rise in 
levels of globalization and democracy in Southeast Asia. This only confirms we are 
indeed to reject our starting general assumption and, additionally, it also provides 
further evidence to support the notable 'third wave' thesis put forward by Samuel P. 
Huntington (1991). 
 
3. 3. The Second Research Hypothesis 
 
To examine our second research hypothesis we decided to conduct statistical analyses 
upon eight out of nine Southeast Asian countries in our sample, focusing on those where 
the Chinese ethnic groups play the role of market-dominant minorities according to Amy 
Chua (2003, 23-48). Once more we correlate variables at the statistical threshold of 5%, 
but this time around we add a multiple linear regression model as an analytical tool. Our 
goal is to confirm the starting assumption that democratic rule and susceptibility to 
global market-oriented economic policies cause more ethnically driven, political and 
economic discrimination against the market-dominant Chinese minorities in Southeast 
Asia in the studied period. 
 Again we present our findings on the independent variables separately, firstly 
addressing the significant correlations between democracy, on the one side, and the 
general position of the Chinese ethnicity and levels of anti-Chinese discrimination, on 
the other. Secondly, we correlate variables on globalization and our dependent 
variables. Finally, we correlate the measure of Chinese market dominance in Southeast 
Asian countries with the levels of democracy, globalization and discrimination against 
this ethnic group and its general standing in the region.  
 Having done so, we shall address the output of the multiple regression model we 
devised to determine to what extent anti-Chinese discrimination is directly caused by 
democracy, globalization and the economic position the Chinese occupy in the studied 
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region. We shall base the acceptance or rejection of our second research hypothesis on 
the outcomes of these analyses. 
 
3. 3. 1. Democracy and the Chinese Ethnic Minorities 
 
We have decided to use the same variables indicating levels of democracy that we used 
while testing our first research hypothesis. The variable EC* serves to measure 
aggregate discrimination against the Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia. After 
correlating the group of variables on democracy with EC* and two other variables 
indicating the general political and economic status of the Chinese vis-à-vis dominant 
ethnic groups, we have found that there is either a rather weak positive correlation 
between the two clusters of variables or, more evidently, no correlation whatsoever.  
 All correlation coefficients between the polity2 variable and the three dependent 
variables fall far below ±0.30. Higher values for polity2 correlate with a decreased 
economic position of the Chinese (-0.21) and with more discrimination against this 
ethnic group at 0.13. It seems that our data were not able to capture a significant 
correlation between democracy and the standing of the Chinese minority. 
 In addition, variables on political rights and civil liberties are positively 
correlated with the aggregate levels of discrimination against the Chinese at 0.34 and 
0.31. In other words, and surprisingly enough, firmer protection of individual rights and 
liberties may lead to more ethnically motivated discrimination against the Chinese.  
 Of course, we do not dare to base a strong argument on this claim; however, we 
note that, while testing our first hypothesis, it became clear that enforcement of 
individual rights and liberties is negatively, although only weakly to moderately, 
correlated with aggregate political and economic discrimination against ethnic groups in 
Southeast Asia. In contrast to that, we can see a completely opposite dynamics in the 
isolated case of the Chinese ethnic minorities. For one reason or the other, and according 
to data we managed to collect and analyze, what stands for all other minority groups in 
Southeast Asia seemingly does not for the Chinese in those countries where they are 
market-dominant minorities. 
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 Freedom 
House Political 
Rights Score 
1972-2013 
Freedom 
House Civil 
Liberties Score 
1972-2013 
EC* - 
Aggregate 
Discrimination 
Against the 
Chinese (SUM 
of Vs 52, 53 
and 54) 
Freedom House Political 
Rights Score 1972-2013 
Pearson Correlation 1 ,833** ,341** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000 ,000 
N 340 340 276 
Freedom House Civil 
Liberties Score 1972-2013 
Pearson Correlation ,833** 1 ,309** 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000  ,000 
N 340 340 276 
EC* - Aggregate 
Discrimination Against the 
Chinese (SUM of Vs 52, 53 
and 54) 
Pearson Correlation ,341** ,309** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000  
N 276 276 416 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table 8. Correlation - political rights, civil liberties and anti-Chinese discrimination 
(EC*)/Singapore excluded.  
 
3. 3. 2. Globalization and the Chinese Ethnic Minorities 
 
To determine the effects globalization has had upon the position of the Chinese minority 
in Southeast Asia we correlated variables from the second cluster on globalization, as we 
had already done before while testing our first hypothesis as well, and variables from 
the fourth cluster to which we added EC*. Unlike with democracy, here we are able to 
detect presence of somewhat stronger correlation coefficients. Overall, globalization 
seems to be moderately positively correlated with political and economic discrimination 
against the Chinese minority and moderately negatively with these groups' economic 
positions vis-à-vis dominant ethnic groups in the eight Southeast Asian countries.  
 The variable on aggregate levels of globalization is positively correlated with 
aggregate anti-Chinese discrimination levels at 0.40. Besides, we find that both 
aggregate and economic globalization lead to a deterioration and expansion of economic 
differentials between the Chinese and the majority groups (-0.56 and -0.49). Moreover, 
aggregate globalization increases the levels of political discrimination against the 
Page 52 of 86 
 
Chinese groups (0.44). And although gross domestic product per capita levels are 
correlated with aggregate anti-Chinese discrimination at 0.20, their rise tends to lead to 
an increase in the levels of political discrimination against the Chinese ethnic groups 
(0.34). 
 When compared with the analysis done within the testing of our first research 
hypothesis, it becomes clearly visible that the Chinese express a greatly different 
dynamics to that of other ethnic minority groups - in the case of all Southeast Asian 
ethnic minorities in the nine studied countries globalization was either not correlated 
with ethnic discrimination or displayed weak negative correlations; now there is a 
moderate positive correlation. Furthermore, whereas globalization only weakly tended 
to increase economic differentials between dominant groups and minorities, now we 
determine strong correlation coefficients, meaning that the dominant groups across the 
eight countries from the sample are targeting the Chinese more strongly than other 
minorities. Simply put, and in accordance with Amy Chua's claims, globalization indeed 
seems to be leading to more discrimination against the Chinese market-dominant 
minorities. When it comes to ethnic discrimination, it truly does not lift all boats. 
 
 EC* - 
Aggregate 
Discrimination 
Against the 
Chinese (SUM 
of Vs 52, 53 
and 54) 
Aggregate Level of Globalization 
1970-2012 (KOF Zurich) 
EC* - Aggregate 
Discrimination Against the 
Chinese (SUM of Vs 52, 53 
and 54) 
Pearson Correlation 1 ,398** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000 
N 416 290 
Aggregate Level of 
Globalization 1970-2012 
(KOF Zurich) 
Pearson Correlation ,398** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000  
N 290 345 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table 9. Correlation - anti-Chinese discrimination (EC*) and aggregate levels of 
globalization/Singapore excluded. 
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3. 3. 3. C* - the Measure of Chinese Minorities' Market Dominance in Southeast Asia 
 
The variable C* was correlated with other variables from the first, second and fourth 
clusters, and, most importantly, with the EC* variable as well. As a result, we find that 
there is only a small number of significant correlations present. On the one hand, the 
correlation coefficient for variables C* and EC* is insignificant both statistically and in 
strength (-0.10 for p-value 0.11). On the other hand, weak coefficients of correlation are 
found between C* and open political competition (0.30), economic globalization (0.36) 
and the aggregate levels of globalization (0.37). This directs us to a tentative conclusion 
about the relationship between the levels of Chinese market dominance and democracy 
and globalization - both of those independent variables tend to elevate the economic 
status of the Chinese minorities.  
 
 
Graph 4. Average levels of Chinese minorities' market dominance in the eight studied 
Southeast Asian countries, 1945-2013. 
 
 Furthermore, the Chinese particularly seem to profit from the embracement of 
the global market-oriented policies and economic opening - additional partial 
correlation we conducted while controlling for the effect of EC* shows that aggregate 
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levels of globalization are clearly positively correlated with C* at 0.44. Bearing in mind 
the previously obtained results from correlating globalization and anti-Chinese 
discrimination, it is rather clear that globalization coincide both with better economic 
standing of and higher degree of discrimination against the Chinese minority groups in 
Southeast Asia.  
 Ultimately, having in mind the relationships of C* and EC* with levels of 
globalization, we are driven to postulate that in the post-1970 period there may be a 
positive correlation between them (one should keep in mind that our data on levels of 
globalization only go back to 1970). Naturally, such a conjecture about variables C* and 
EC* does not change the fact that we failed to identify their real correlation from the 
collected data. 
 
 C* - Measure of 
Chinese 
Market 
Dominance in 
South East Asia 
(based on Chua 
and other 
sources) 
Aggregate Level of Globalization 
1970-2012 (KOF Zurich) 
C* - Measure of Chinese 
Market Dominance in 
South East Asia (based on 
Chua and other sources) 
Pearson Correlation 1 ,368** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
,000 
N 533 345 
Aggregate Level of 
Globalization 1970-2012 
(KOF Zurich) 
Pearson Correlation ,368** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 
 
N 345 345 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table 10. Correlation - Chinese minorities' market dominance in Southeast Asia (C*) 
and aggregate levels of globalization/Singapore excluded.  
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3. 3. 4. The Multiple Linear Regression Model 
 
Before examining the second research hypothesis in toto, we address the conducted 
multiple linear regression model used to determine to causal links between the levels of 
anti-Chinese discrimination as the dependent, and democracy, globalization and the 
Chinese market dominance as independent variables. Results of the statistical analysis in 
question are given below in Tables 11 and 12. 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 ,526a ,277 ,270 1,63761 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Aggregate Level of Globalization 1970-2012 (KOF Zurich), C* - Measure of 
Chinese Market Dominance in South East Asia (based on Chua and other sources), Polity2 Score 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 294,069 3 98,023 36,552 ,000b 
Residual 766,982 286 2,682   
Total 1061,051 289    
a. Dependent Variable: EC* - Aggregate Discrimination Against the Chinese (SUM of Vs 52, 53 and 54) 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Aggregate Level of Globalization 1970-2012 (KOF Zurich), C* - Measure of 
Chinese Market Dominance in South East Asia (based on Chua and other sources), Polity2 Score 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) -,485 ,390  -1,245 ,214 
Polity2 Score -,110 ,023 -,354 -4,842 ,000 
C* - Measure of Chinese 
Market Dominance in 
South East Asia (based on 
Chua and other sources) 
-,470 ,093 -,274 -5,069 ,000 
Aggregate Level of 
Globalization 1970-2012 
(KOF Zurich) 
,088 ,009 ,756 9,892 ,000 
a. Dependent Variable: EC* - Aggregate Discrimination Against the Chinese (SUM of Vs 52, 53 and 54) 
Table 11. Multiple linear regression model summary/Singapore excluded 
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Independent Variables' Colinearity Statistics 
Variable Tolerance VIF 
Polity2 Score 
,472 2,118 
C* - Measure of Chinese Market 
Dominance in South East Asia (based on 
Chua and other sources) 
,432 2,314 
Aggregate Level of Globalization 1970-
2012 (KOF Zurich) ,863 1,159 
Table 12. Colinearity statistics/Singapore excluded 
 
 Tables 11 (model summary, ANOVA test and regression coefficients) and 12 
(colinearity statistics) show that the three independent variables explain 28% of the 
dependent variable EC*'s variance, value of F is significantly different from 0 (F=36,552, 
p-value<0.05), meaning that the results did not occur by chance or sampling error, and 
that there is no cause for alarm when it comes to colinearity, as tolerance and VIF levels 
are higher than 0,4 and lower than 10 respectively. 
 As evident, after the regression formula has been supplied with regression 
coefficients, it takes the following forms: 
 a) when considering unstandardized coefficients: EC* = -0.49 + 0.09 x 
GLOBALIZATION - 0.11 x DEMOCRACY - 0.47 x C*, and 
 b) when considering standardized coefficients: EC* = 0.76 x GLOBALIZATION - 
0.35 x DEMOCRACY - 0.27 x C*. 
 We have already addressed the meaning of standardized regression coefficients 
that place variables with different levels of values on the same scale. Relying on them, 
we conclude that: 
 a) one unit increase in globalization levels will cause a rise in the levels of anti-
Chinese discrimination of 0.76 units, 
 b) one unit increase in democracy will cause a decline in the levels of anti-Chinese 
discrimination of 0.35 units, and 
 c) one unit increase in Chinese market dominance will cause a decline in the 
levels of anti-Chinese discrimination of 0.27 units. 
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 On the one side, the globalization variable's regression coefficient confirms our 
conclusion based on correlations between aggregate levels of globalization and anti-
Chinese discrimination in Southeast Asia. On the other, the regression model points to 
the fact that both more democracy and higher levels of Chinese market dominance cause 
somewhat less political and economic discrimination against the Chinese minorities. 
This is in a slight contrast with our previous findings, as we determined that there were 
no strong correlations between the variables in question. Therefore, we are obliged to 
consider these issues closely when passing the final judgement upon this project's 
second research hypothesis. 
 
3. 3. 5. Examination of the Second Research Hypothesis 
 
Having applied the chosen analytical methods and having scrutinized the outcomes of 
our statistical analyses, we are not in the position to fully accept our initial claim as 
valid. There simply is not enough evidence to support the assumption that democratic 
rule and susceptibility to global market-oriented policies led to more ethnically driven, 
political and economic discrimination against the market-dominant Chinese minorities 
in the eight Southeast Asian countries in the period 1945-2013. 
 
 
Graph 5. Average levels of anti-Chinese discrimination in Southeast Asia, 1950-2006. 
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 However, if we decided to break our hypothesis down and separately elaborate 
on its segments, we would notice that higher levels of globalization do indicate more 
anti-Chinese discrimination. We confidently assert so after identifying positive 
correlation and regression coefficients between these variables (aggregate levels of 
globalization ↔ EC*: 0.40, regression Beta coefficient 0.76).  
 The nature of a political regime, specifically its adoption of democratic 
procedures and practices, does not seem to have a strong influence upon the general 
treatment of the Chinese minority in Southeast Asia. Apparently, the same stands for the 
degree of Chinese market dominance. Although both of these independent variables 
displayed weak negative regression coefficients, there were no correlations significant 
enough, statistically and in strength, to guide us to conclude that they perform a strong 
effect over the levels of anti-Chinese discrimination in the region.  
 Hence, having confirmed the presumed influence of only one out of three 
independent variables over our dependent variable, we find our results to be quite 
ambivalent. Notwithstanding, after having compared the conclusions on our two 
research hypotheses, we clearly see that the Chinese ethnic minority in Southeast Asia 
definitely distorts the general ethnic politics' dynamics of the region. Whereas 
globalization and democracy lead to less armed ethnic conflict and arguably bring the 
average levels of political and economic discrimination against minority groups down, 
our data expose different patterns when it comes to the Chinese minorities. 
 More globalization only makes differences in economic standing between the 
Chinese minorities, dominant groups and other ethnic minorities starker. Following the 
results of our analysis, we could argue that such differences lead to more political and 
economic anti-Chinese discrimination, no matter the nature of a political regime within 
which this dynamics develops. What is slightly confusing here is the fact that we have 
not been able to confirm the existence of a positive correlation between our variables C* 
and EC*, although we suspect this might be due to the prevailing lack of detailed, 
accessible data on the Chinese minority in Southeast Asia.  
 Be that as it may, and no matter how far the results presented in this chapter fall 
from the project's initial assumptions, it is evident that Amy Chua was on the right track 
when commencing her analysis of globalization, democracy and ethnic conflict by 
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addressing the economic dominance of the Chinese ethnic minorities in Southeast Asian 
countries.  
 
3. 4. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we presented the results of statistical analyses performed upon our 
research dataset. Having grounded our arguments in the outcomes of the conducted 
correlations and regressions, we completely rejected the first of our hypotheses and 
most of the claims present in the second.  
 In sum, and simply put, we showed that more democracy and higher levels of 
globalization led to a decline in the aggregate levels of ethnic conflict in Southeast Asia in 
the period 1945-2013. Moreover, we determined that globalization tended to lead to 
higher levels of anti-Chinese political and economic discrimination in those eight 
countries of the region where the Chinese minorities are market-dominant, although 
there was no evidence whatsoever that democracy and particular degrees of Chinese 
market dominance had a similar effect upon the same dependent variable.  
 In the following chapter we take on these conclusions and offer a broader 
discussion on their implications. We dwell upon the details of our analyses, address the 
temporal and spatial universality of our findings and generate a wider elaboration of 
ethnicity, ethnic diversity and ethnic conflict in the context of the changing nature of 
political regimes and globalization. 
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IV Discussion 
 
4. 1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter we are in pursuit of two goals. In the first sub-section we present some 
afterthoughts on the results of our analyses and the examination of our two research 
hypotheses related to the Southeast Asian region. By addressing the general ethnic 
politics' dynamics of the studied geographical area, we shall try to gain a deeper 
comprehension of the outcomes of our analyses. 
 In the second sub-section we generate a wider debate on the universality of our 
findings across world regions and historical periods. The objective is to review the 
ultimate results of this project from a global perspective and to offer a set of general 
conclusions about ethnic diversity, conflict and democracy in the context of 
globalization.  
 
4. 2. Ethnic Politics in Southeast Asia - Reflections upon Research 
Hypotheses 
 
"Ethnicity inhabits a shadow world - designated 
as subversive communalism at one moment, but 
applauded as the legitimate articulation of 
cultural values at another." (Brown 1995, 264) 
 
There are two common ways in which ethnicity relates to the nation-state as the highest 
form of modern political authority. The first is denoted in the term political nation, the 
second in cultural nation. In the first formulation the state claims that its citizens 
willingly constitute a community, sharing equal duties, rights and status, irrespective of 
their racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic backgrounds. They are a nation because they 
believe themselves to be one. A nation that is ethnically neutral, where meritocratic and 
universalistic procedures are employed to define citizenship rights.  
Page 61 of 86 
 
 Alternatively, a cultural nation is defined by a distinct group with its own 
language, history and homeland. Here the whole society is portrayed as an ethnic 
community, offering particular form of identity, security and authority. Therefore, the 
more clearly an individual possesses the cultural features of the national community, the 
more fully he or she deserves the citizenship rights (Kohn 1967; Meinecke 1970; Brown 
1995, 260-261). 
 However, the contemporary political history is teeming with examples of nation-
states employing both concepts, simultaneously assigning equal citizenship rights to all 
their citizens and defining the nation in cultural terms. This incoherence, that hinders 
the effective management of ethnic-state relations, has been a constant feature of the 
Southeast Asian region after most of its countries gained independence in the period 
following the Second World War. Moreover, adding democracy to the mix does not 
necessarily overcome this ambiguity. On the contrary, democracy has often been used in 
Southeast Asia to legitimate the dominance of ethnic majorities in ethno-culturally 
plural societies, enhancing inter-group suspicion, resentment and violent outbreaks. Or, 
depicted as anti-democratic and undermining the desired national consensus, ethnic 
pluralism has been used to justify oppressive rule and soft authoritarianism across the 
region, harshly containing ethnic discontent (Brown 1995, 261).  
 Having these, and other similar presumptions addressed in the first chapter, in 
mind, we sought to test the assumptions of our first research hypothesis. It seemed that 
democracy and globalization would only infuriate the already existing conditions in 
Southeast Asia that, according to Stefan Wolff, usually lead to escalation of inter-ethnic 
conflict - structural factors such as weak states that do not have control over their entire 
territories (Indonesia, Myanmar), political and economic factors including 
discriminatory ethnic policies of uneven development (Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines), or cultural factors such as impositions of restrictive language rules 
(Cambodia, Thailand) (Wolff 2006, 68-69). As the average levels of democracy (polity2 
variable) in the region first went down from 1.75 in 1952 to the record-breaking lowest 
-5.50 in 1976, and then up again to 1.33 in 2013, we expected to identify levels of ethnic 
conflict corresponding to such waves of authoritarianism, when ethnic conflict would be 
firmly contained, and democratization, when it would escalate.  
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 And yet, after conducting the described statistical analyses, we rejected the first 
research hypothesis. As shown, it turned out that implementation of democratic 
practices and higher globalization levels indicate less ethnic conflict in Southeast Asia. 
Although such findings contradict our initial assumptions based on the works of Amy 
Chua and other scholars sceptical of free market democracy, they fall in line with the 
claims made by Ted Robert Gurr, University of Maryland professor and the founder of 
Minorities at Risk project, that the new global strategy of containing ethnic conflict is, in 
fact, complementary with democracy. Gurr held in 1999 that devolution of state power, 
power sharing mechanisms and recognition of minority rights have widely been 
accepted as accommodative government policies (Gurr 1999, 52). His argumentation 
was also confirmed by a new major study in 2014, which showed that there indeed has 
been a global pacifying trend in ethnic relations (Cederman et al. 2014). Bearing 
everything said in mind, the Southeast Asian region seems to be following this general 
global dynamics after all.  
 Nevertheless, such a conclusion does not take into account the role played by 
market-dominant ethnic minorities. As we have showed in our analysis, the pacifying 
effects of democracy, and above all globalization, do not fully apply to the case of the 
Chinese ethnic minority groups in Southeast Asia. In accordance with Amy Chua's 
argumentation, we managed to offer evidence to support the claim from our second 
hypothesis that economic opening and endorsement of globally-oriented market policies 
across Southeast Asia led to a rapid accumulation of wealth by an outsider, 
nonindigenous minority, broadening the already existing economic inequalities, breeding 
ethnic resentment and, ultimately, leading to discriminatory economic and civil policies 
targeting Chinese communities and their businesses. Apparently, not even higher levels 
of adoption of democratic practices can firmly contain such widely spread anti-Chinese 
sentiments, because in many cases majoritarian rule in its rawest form provides 
additional opportunities for populists to supply hatred towards a minority, trying to 
discredit potential minority-friendly political opponents (Glaeser 2005). 
 In addition, we hold a strong belief that the existing data we collected and 
conducted analyses upon do not do perfectly well to indicate how vulnerable and 
exposed to discrimination the Chinese actually have been in Southeast Asia. We hold 
that if there were more detailed and nuanced data available, the correlation coefficients 
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between the levels of globalization, possibly of democracy as well, and the levels of anti-
Chinese discrimination and violence would be more strongly positive. To the best of our 
knowledge, there is no accessible data on the levels of Chinese market dominance 
whatsoever; furthermore, the existing data seem to be too static and unable to indicate 
the presence of major violent incidents or changes in policies directed at the Chinese 
minorities.  
 If Minorities at Risk datasets are taken as an illustration, one finds that the values 
for a number of variables addressing the position of the Chinese (and all the other 
studied minorities) only rarely vary over time. That strongly contradicts the fact that 
occasional outbursts of anti-Chinese protest and/or violence have been taking place in 
Southeast Asia for decades. The already mentioned 1998 riots in Indonesia serve as an 
example, following the line of those from the same country in 1959-1960, Malaysia in 
1969 or Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos in 1976-1979 (Minority Rights Group 
International 1992, 10 and 12). In our dataset we based the EC* variable on the existing 
accounts of anti-Chinese discrimination and realized that its values often remain the 
same over time despite the mentioned excessive outbreaks of anti-Chinese riots or 
introduction of discriminatory policies (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). If we took the 
violent riots targeting the Chinese in Malaysia in 1969, we would see that the existing 
data do not indicate a significant change of general levels of anti-Chinese discrimination 
in that period, both preceding and following 1969 (our dataset in presented in Annex II).  
 Nor can the existing data properly address the fine-tuned, consciously pursued 
policies of the Thai government, aiming at eliminating the Chinese as a distinct ethnic 
minority. As Amy Chua puts it: "Whether an assimilation achieved through decades of 
confiscation, coercive social polices, and cultural obliteration, is an end that justifies its 
means is open to question" (Chua 2003, 184). Nor, for that matter, can the existing data 
accurately indicate to what extent Singapore is ethnically stable, having a majority 
clearly economically outperforming that city-state's minorities. There we are dealing 
with an inverted case where presence of a market-dominant majority is actually feeding 
ethnic animosity and intolerance (Brown 1995, 66-111). 
 Be that as it may, future students of the Chinese ethnic groups in Southeast Asia 
should have to collect and rely on more detailed data, if they strive to produce more 
balanced and refined conclusions. We are quite certain that the datasets available to 
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researchers of ethnic conflict and ethnic relations are doing well to point to the most 
important ethnic groups at risk. However, we feel they could do more to offer detailed 
accounts of ethnic minorities' positions vis-à-vis other, including the dominant, groups 
over time, thus enabling us to discern more easily the relationships between political 
regime changes and levels of violence and discrimination targeting market-dominant 
and other ethnic minorities. 
 After having offered a brief reconsideration of our two research hypotheses 
strictly related to Southeast Asia and the outcomes of their testing, in the next and final 
sub-section of this chapter we strive to place the results of our analyses in a global 
context. We aim to assess the universality of our initial assumptions and our findings 
across time and space. 
 
4. 3. Research Hypotheses from a Global Perspective 
 
We shall open the following sub-section by addressing the issues of ethnic diversity and 
market-dominant minorities from a historical perspective. We aim to locate in time a 
number of processes corresponding in nature to the content of our two research 
hypotheses. Thereafter, with the region of Southeast Asia in mind, we offer a brief 
contemporary analysis of ethnic diversity and political stability in other world regions. 
Finally, in the third part of the sub-section, we shall strive to review the general findings 
of this project from a global context. 
 
4. 3. 1. Ethnic Diversity and Market-Dominant Minorities - Historical Reflections 
 
When Friedrich Nietzsche proclaimed that God was dead in the last quarter of the 19th 
century, he was doing so in a distressing mood looking forward to the breakdown of 
values and traditional morality. This revaluation had already been in process in the 19th 
century, as the new French and American revolutions' foundational myths shattered the 
concept of divine right of kings. By the mid-20th century this revolution in thought had 
taken monarchies and empires to the grave with it.  One of the new value systems that 
emerged was nationalism, often based on an ethnic core. Nietzsche feared the 
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animalistic passions of the human animal and what horrors it would unleash on the 
world. One of the eternal passions that he, and Hobbes for that matter, feared were the 
human attitude for violence unshackled from the moral chains of strict religious 
devotion (Fukuyama 2011, 770). 
 Violence has been a recurring theme in this project and along with it a just as 
present passion - envy. The German sociologist Helmut Schoeck described jealousy as 
distinct from envy. The former was the sin of coveting of what others had gained, while 
envy was the feeling of not wanting others to gain and posses anything at all. The reason 
envy is so powerful is that the envious, unlike the jealous, cannot be bought off, and an 
attempt to do so would only affirm the bitterness (Schoeck 2010, 17). Schoeck 
investigated envy in many a society and concluded that: "it is difficult to envisage what it 
means for the economic and technical development of a community when, almost 
automatically and as a matter of principle, the future dimension is banned from human 
intercourse and conversation, when it cannot even be discussed. Ubiquitous envy, fear of 
it and those who harbour it, cuts off such people from any kind of communal action 
directed towards the future. All striving, all preparation and planning for the future can 
be undertaken only by socially fragmented, secretive beings" (Rothbard 2000, 273). 
 Schoeck believed that the teaching of envy as sin, from the time of the medieval 
church, for generations helped to mitigate against it and is a part of the reason for the 
dramatic western economic growth (McCloskey 2006, 14). And it is this trait more than 
any other that explains the hostility towards market-dominant minorities. To use the 
example of the Chinese market-dominant minorities - their wealth is inevitably seen as 
being the result of conniving and exploitative practices. This does have certain merit in 
the case of some of the Chinese millionaires aligning themselves with autocrats in order 
to get political and economic privileges. But in reality, much of the wealth has been 
gotten by the high productivity of the Chinese versus their ethnic surroundings. 
Acknowledging the merit of an alien group bettering one's one has never been a normal 
human trait and especially when one's own group is living in poverty. Under such 
conditions merit becomes obsolete and irrelevant, no matter the amount of evidence 
presented to the contrary. So it should come as no surprise that we find this behaviour 
continually throughout history: "For majority populations, the difficulty is to choose 
between the long-run indirect benefits that flow from accommodating such over-
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achieving minorities, and the short-run temptations to give in to feelings of envy and 
pillage them. In Britain, the minorities were tolerated and the economy as a whole 
reaped the benefit. In Central and Eastern Europe armed robbery prevailed, with the 
predictable consequences of long-term impoverishment" (Ferguson 2001, 382). In the 
following paragraphs we shall explore some of these historical cases of Chua's thesis and 
the problems of ethnic diversity. 
 Europe prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, and especially in the 
interbellum period, serves as a good example of both ethnically diverse countries and 
ethnic inequality. Historically, the Jews have been the classic case of a market-dominant 
minority in Eastern Europe. This was true to a lesser, but still important sense in 
Western Europe. From the time of the Middle Ages, the Jews would be invited by foreign 
kings and leaders in order to develop their countries. By the time of the second 
millennium, they had ceased to be a rural people, as one of the first in the world, and 
were in many ways a proto-modern people in their occupational orientation, as well as 
in their strong emphasis on intellectual rigor and human capital (Slezkine 2011). 
 As Western Europe recovered from the Dark Ages in the High Middle Ages and 
the Renaissance, the position of the Jews became more fragile as competing merchants 
sought to replace them through exclusionary guilds. Moreover, peasants would more 
than rival the merchants' enmity towards the Jews - their role as money lenders and tax 
collectors for the local lords would only enhance the hatred from the peasants. Not to 
mention the long standing religious hostility from the Church. This led to countless 
pogroms that would follow the Jewish people for centuries. The most persistent pattern 
with the Jewish market-dominant minority was one of expulsion, as a country or 
kingdom developed and no longer needed them. In such case, leaders that had 
previously protected them from an unfriendly majority population found it expedient to 
expel them. It was in this manner that a majority of Jews would find themselves in 
Eastern Europe in the second half of the last millennium (Johnson 1987). 
 The problem of self-determination after World War I demonstrated that the first 
nations in which this new experiment would be tried were particularly unfit for it. The 
principle was an armed doctrine, because there were large areas within the newly 
established nation-states where minorities were and had been for centuries clear 
majorities. This was true of the Germans and Hungarians, not to mention the creation of 
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Yugoslavia which was essentially Greater Serbia, but unlike "Greater Prussia", Germany, 
and "Greater Piedmont", Italy, it consisted of a mishmash of ethnic-lingual-religious 
groups. What seemed to had held was a combination of declining multiethnic empires 
that provided security from eruption of ethnic conflict and dramatic economic swings. It 
is interesting to note that the pre-1914 period was characterized by an increasing 
globalization similar in its novelty and leaps to the present age, accelerating the spread 
of ideas of nationhood and ethnic consciousness (Ferguson 2006, xli; Thomas & 
Thompson 2013).  
 The German question had been geopolitically, and hypocritically, avoided by the 
victors at Versailles in 1918-1919. The aim had been to construct new states based on 
the Wilsonian self-determination notion. It ignored the large German minorities of 12 
million that had occupied Central Europe for centuries, often replacing Jews as more 
acceptable economic modernizers and formed part of the nobility and the academy. 
Beginning in the 19th century they became periled, as new national identities started to 
claim the mantle of oppression and disparity at the hands of the Germans (Mazower 
1998).  
 In the Czech area of Bohemia, Germans had built and run roads, churches, 
universities, to name but a few things. German was the preferred language in business, 
the clergy and the military. For the aspiring Czech intelligentsia, this was an affront to 
their national sensibilities, since these institutions were undoubtedly German, despite 
the cultural and economic progress and heritage that the Czech would enjoy from it. The 
Czech intelligentsia wanted the same nation-building process of homogenization that 
characterized other nation-states. Every real and symbolic grievance became intensified 
with time with ever greater demands. Street signs had been in both Czech and German, 
but were changed to Czech only. This was followed by demands for posts in high 
prestigious universities, which in turn aggrieved the Germans who had identified 
themselves as Bohemians or Budweisers, but started to organize themselves on the 
basis of their German ethnicity. It should come as no surprise that it was from these 
places that the most antagonistic German Nazis and collaborators came from (Sowell 
2005, 273). 
 The problem was also true in several European countries and included the 
widespread and large Hungarian minorities, engulfing political lives of Romania, 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Interwar protectionism and economic autarky, the 
Page 68 of 86 
 
result of World War One statism, was not merely an inter-state problem. It had its 
equivalent at the national level with ethnic nepotism and inequality as the primary 
engine. As noted previously by historian Paul Johnson, economic and political 
discrimination was rife in Central and Eastern Europe (Johnson 1992).  
 The problem was not merely the fictitiousness of the new states and ethnic 
imbalances. The League of Nations had raised the principle of minority rights as a 
compliment to self-determination. This became a pretext under which Hitler could 
complain about inefficacy of the League, which in part led to a more benign view on 
German appropriations in the 1930s. Another reason was that the great powers 
entrusted with carrying out the League's mandate had a strong interest in not 
legitimizing these principles by effective action. As one high official in the Foreign Office 
noted, these principles would give the League: "the right to protect the Chinese in 
Liverpool, the Roman Catholics in France, the French in Canada, quite apart from more 
serious problems, such as the Irish. Even if the denial of such a right elsewhere might 
lead to injustice and oppression, that was better than to allow everything which means 
the negation of the sovereignty of every state in the world" (Ferguson 2001, 379; 
Mazower 2004, 382). 
 It would only be in the aftermath of the Second World War that the ethnic 
problem would be solved in Central Europe. Population transfers became the means by 
which Europe started to become more homogeneous. Up to 12 million Germans had to 
leave, with hundreds of thousands dying on the way. In other cases the transfers were 
more humane and included 4 million Poles, 500.000 Ukrainians, Belarusians and 
Lithuanians; 100.000 Hungarians and Slovaks; 150.000 Turks. In the case of Turkey, the 
country had been engaging in population exchanges with Greece after establishing the 
modern Turkish state in the early 1920s. Preceding it, there had been an ethnic 
cleansing and subsequent war with the Armenians (Schechtman 1962, 363). As Mark 
Mazower noted: "War, violence and massive social dislocation turned Versailles' dreams 
of national homogeneity into realities" (Mazower 1998, 224). 
 The only place left un-cleansed was Yugoslavia which would await another 45 
years. Unlike the relatively cooperative efforts of post-1945 Central Europe, it would 
take a particularly gruesome path to ethnic homogeneity. As in interwar Central Europe, 
population groups had been moved around which did not allow for clear boundaries to 
be settled. Additionally, the fluidity of identity ranged from groups in big urban centres 
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that associated themselves with a non-ethnic cosmopolitan identity, like the 
"Sarajevans", to rural populations true to their ethno-religious backgrounds. Be that as it 
may, the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1991-1995 was tainted by ethnic cleansing, mass 
expulsions and population movements, and genocide (Mazower 1997). 
 
4. 3. 2. Contemporary View 
 
In World on Fire, Chua comments that Latin America is a peculiar case, since its ethnic 
and racial distinctions are quite varied. In countries like Brazil there had long been talk 
of having a post-racial nation with no clearly defined racial identity. In recent times the 
racial tide has started to turn however. What Chua calls "pigmentocracy" rules instead 
(Chua 2003, 59). 
 In large parts of Latin American history there had been extensive inter-ethnic 
relations (inter-marriage) between the conquering Europeans and the Indian natives 
that led to a wide variety of ethnic distinctions and an elaborate ethnic-social 
classification system. While the social marker was determined by lightness of skin, it 
was far easier to move up the social ladder and attain a new position. This stood in 
contrast to the American one drop rule, which proscribed that any African heritage 
would make one African. In the American case, this had a unifying, although involuntary, 
effect on blacks, which later made it more effective in political activism when the social 
climate allowed for it (Sowell 1994, 147). 
 Chua argues that this racial ambiguity in Latin America has suppressed ethnic 
identities and therefore ethnic conflict. The racial, social and economic patterns have 
persisted and the same grievances have expressed themselves through class 
consciousness. Racial undertones only occasionally rose to the surface through social 
and economic movements. It is this undercurrent, and not Marxism, that drove many 
revolutions and large socialist measures against the white European-descended market-
dominant elite. Like the case of Southeast Asia, the majorities have tended to oppose 
economic liberalism and globalization, with the commanding heights of the economy 
being dominated by the white elites, along with their foreign, often American, 
counterparts (Chua 1995). 
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 Beginning in the last couple of decades there has been a more explicit racial 
change in thinking.  These new winds begat political success in the last decade with 
Venezuela's Hugo Chavez and Bolivia's Evo Morales being the best known champions of 
the Indian-ethnic politics. While governments had long sought to suppress and 
downplay ethnic classification, the new racial consciousness has pushed for explicit 
recognition of indigenous minorities and their rights, with international institutions like 
International Labour Organization and the United Nations backing up these movements 
(Yashar 2015).   
 The increased ethnic awareness and complimentary political-economic policies 
have created deep divides. In the case of Bolivia the western, and more Indian, region is 
championing more socialistic policies, while the eastern white region is promoting 
neoliberal policies. There have even been talks of secession in these latter regions under 
the presidency of Morales (DeMoura 2007). In Brazil, people who were predominantly 
black "demanded to be not thought of as black" (Chua 2003, 73). In part, the racial 
currents from the rest of Latin America and also the global culture have played a part in 
changing racial consciousness in Brazil. The spread of black American hip-hop music has 
played a particularly important role in black Brazilians accepting African identities 
(Chua 2003, 76). In 2012 Brazil adopted affirmative action policies in universities for 
people of African descent, just like in the United States (Yashar 2015).   
  In contrast to Latin America, Africa resembles Central Europe and Eastern 
Europe from the interbellum period. While Central Eastern Europe was highly ethnically 
heterogeneous, the African map of ethnic diversity is even more complicated, belying the 
impracticability of nation-states across the continent (Larson 2011). Colonial rule forced 
tribes to cooperate and trade in ways that had not occurred before. The imperial powers 
had an interest in providing rule of law, but as decolonization unfolded, there was a 
descent into the abyss of tribal conflict. Given the large amount of ethnic-tribal 
identities, the relative success of Botswana serves as a confirmation of the diversity-
stability thesis in Africa. With an ethnic majority of 79%, this country has managed to 
protect private property and economic freedom above the continental and world 
average (Heritage 2015). Additionally, Botswana managed to avoid the so-called 
resource curse (Chuchan-Pole and Angwafo 2011, 81).  
 In the Middle East, the Iraq War brought about the fall of the autocrat Saddam 
Hussein and a return to religious sectarian strife that has birthed radical religious 
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movements such as the Sunni-based Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. In its rise from 
the roubles of Iraq, it became more dominant spreading into Bashar Assad's Syria, 
already engulfed in a prolonged, bloody civil war. The Arab Spring has liberated mass 
hostilities towards the region's long-standing religious minorities as previously 
mentioned. On top of this, the understated tribal problems in the Middle East have 
played a significant role in supporting the macro level religious conflicts, as well as in 
undermining the post-Saddam nation-building processes (Salzman 2008). 
 Even in Europe, the ethnic question has returned in Belgium and Scotland. The 
former has been overwhelmed with internal disunity leading to almost two years 
without a central government in 2010-2011. A split between the French-speaking and 
the Flemish-speaking seems likely to occur. In the United Kingdom, Scotland is on the 
same road to secession with the rise of the Scottish National Party and a referendum 
that only narrowly kept the almost 300 years old Union intact, with the future looking 
dim. Riding on the same waves are Catalan aspirations in Spain, following a similar 
strategy of ever more autonomy. 
 
4. 3. 3. Ethnic Diversity and Conflict from a Global Perspective 
 
Various attempts have been made to measure ethnic violence within territories, either 
between majorities or minorities or between states and minorities. Some include 
economic modelling that suggests, in line with Gurr (1999), that constitutional 
protections are the best vanguard against creating political incentives for ethnic 
demagogy (Glaeser 2005). In other cases, we have seen that crime tends to occur in 
areas alongside ethnic borders. This holds true even in one of the model countries for 
multiethnic, consociational polities like Switzerland, as well as it did in more troubled 
states like former Yugoslavia and India. Furthermore, a study shows that it is 
geographical ethnic separation within polities that creates stable socio-economic and 
political conditions, which in turn decrease ethnic or communal violence (Rutherford et 
al. 2015). 
 Niall Ferguson, relying on Freedom House statistics, asserted that regimes with 
ethnic majorities of more then 66% of total population tend to be able to sustain 
democracies, while more fragmented tend to be less free (Ferguson 2001, 385). This 
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might be related to the long-term rise in civil wars that began after the Second World 
War. In such a view it could be argued that, with post-1945 precedent of sacrosanct 
borders, the conflicts have erupted internally. In the early 1990s the unexpected rise of 
ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia and Rwanda led to predictions of mounting ethnic civil wars 
(Kaplan, 1994). Also following the ethnic theme was Samuel Huntington's well-known 
Clash of Civilizations (1993), that predicted greater culturally-flared frictions.  
 Opposing these and many other scholars, Gurr (1999) argued that the tragic 
genocides in the Balkans and Rwanda were obscuring a pervasive trend of pacification 
that was going on and that general levels of ethnic conflicts had in fact peaked earlier 
and were coming down. The conflict period from 1988-1992, with the collapse of the 
Soviet empire and the end of the Cold War, was only an expected recourse to a new 
situation with a wide secular decline in violence (Mesquita et al. 1999; Clarke 2001, 664; 
Pinker 2011). Gurr offered several reasons for this decline, with political 
accommodation being the key mechanism for deescalating conflicts or working out deals 
with separatist movements. In other cases, states were increasingly offering protection 
and rights to minorities which helped diffuse aspiring ethnic conflicts. It seemed that 
globalizing trends of appeals to international norms and increased focus on trade 
relations made for more accommodative governments.  
 A group of authors (Cederman et al. 2014) attempted to test whether Gurr or 
Kaplan had made accurate predictions in the subsequent years. They find that Gurr's 
logic of accommodation with various forms of autonomy and negotiation holds up very 
well. States following international norms, and ethnic minorities appealing to them, 
seemed to have caused a significant decline in ethnic conflicts and civil wars. What is 
equally remarkable is that the trend holds for autocratic regimes as well, although it 
appears to be stronger in democratic polities. The findings seem to offer an optimistic 
trend for the future with increased global values, universal institutions and norms 
affecting national government policies, and communication flows allowing for the 
addressing of ethnic minority abuses and concerns (Cmiel 2004). 
 In the last note, there have been only a few studies inspired by Chua's thesis. 
Bezemer and Jong-A-Pin (2013) tested it on Africa and found that the presence of 
market-dominant minorities indicates a significant rise in violence in democratic 
countries as globalization goes up. Conversely, they also concluded that the market-
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dominant minority thesis does not hold up on a more global basis. In a working paper 
Alesina, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2012) explore ethnic economic inequality, 
rather than market-dominant minorities, and find a correlation between it and higher 
ethnic discrimination, provision of public goods and a general tendency towards 
underdevelopment. Inverting Chua's thesis, a group of authors showed that there is a 
link between internal ethnic conflict and civil war, and the presence of economically 
inferior ethnic minorities (Cederman et al. 2013).  
 The topic of ethnic economic inequalities has proven to be quite significant, both 
historically and at the present, as our study also affirmed how globalization seems to 
have exacerbated problems with the Chinese minority in Southeast Asia. In contrast, it 
seems that the historical link between democracy and inter-ethnic conflict has been 
declining. While a surprise, it is not completely in contrast with our starting 
expectations, as it is the increased focus on minority rights and global political norms 
that is driving the seeming decline in ethnic conflict.  
 
4. 4. Conclusion 
 
We initiated the discussion chapter by paying additional attention to the region of 
Southeast Asia and the examination of the two research hypotheses related to the 
region.  We reconfirmed our initial findings by asserting that a gradual decline in the 
levels of ethnic conflict has been accompanied by a wave of democratization and 
globalization, particularly in the post-1970s period. Such a conclusion went straight 
against our original assumptions about the relationship between ethnic conflict, 
democracy and globalization. However, we stressed the importance of the Chinese 
market-dominant minorities, whose presence alters the general dynamics of Southeast 
Asian ethnic politics. 
 No matter the fact we operated with imperfect data, our results clearly pointed to 
the fact that higher levels of globalization indicate harsher anti-Chinese policies in the 
region; seemingly, such economic and political discrimination cannot be fully contained 
even by democratic regimes. By doing so, we, at least to a certain extent, validated the 
argumentation of Amy Chua, the author whose work inspired this project.  
Page 74 of 86 
 
 Finally, in the second sub-section, we strived to test the universality of our 
findings and search for historical and contemporary analogies. We briefly addressed the 
Central and Eastern European modern historical experience, the recent developments in 
Latin America, the general state of ethnic relations in Africa and the Middle East, and the 
current European political processes, trying to connect them with the line of thinking 
about ethnicity, market-dominant minorities, democracy and globalization this project 
had adopted. Consequently, we concluded that the same inter-ethnic dynamics present 
in Southeast Asia can be identified in different world regions across historical periods. 
Namely, a significant decline in the levels of inter-ethnic violence associated with 
democracy in the context of globalization, unless there is a market-dominant, starkly 
wealthy and ethnically foreign minority present. 
 The last portion of this project brings all the research segments together and 
displays our final remarks on all the raised issues. 
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Conclusion 
 
This project's main objective was to conduct a study of ethnic diversity and inter-ethnic 
relations and conflict in the context of changing political regimes and globalization. The 
fundamental assumption that reinforced our thinking was that ethnic diversity can 
undermine political stability, particularly of democratic regimes characterised by 
openness of political competition and, consequently, majoritarian rule. 
 We started out by addressing a number of classical, traditional 18th and 19th-
century and au courant authors concerned that adoption of mass democracy could 
destabilize ethnically diverse political communities. Thence, we introduced the 
contemporary works of Amy Chua, the scholar who established the concept of market-
dominant ethnic minorities as the cornerstone of her critique of destabilizing effects of 
free market democracy in the era of globalization. Combining such ideational 
perceptions of ethnicity, democracy and globalization, we chose the region of Southeast 
Asia after 1945 as our research case, narrowing down the scope of our project. We 
decided to do so not only because the region in question has been tarnished by intensive 
outbreaks of political, ethnically-motivated violence and discrimination, but also 
because it served as the staring point in Chua's analysis of market-dominant minorities.  
 Aiming to assess the validity of our presumptions, we devised two research 
hypotheses to be tested quantitatively. Firstly, we claimed that post-1945 Southeast 
Asian democratic regimes, more firmly integrated within the global economic and 
financial system and endorsing free market policies, are more prone to internal ethnic 
conflict and discrimination than their autocratic counterparts. Secondly, we asserted 
that the Chinese market-dominant ethnic groups in Southeast Asian countries in the 
same period are more likely to be discriminated against in democratic regimes that 
endorse the global market and globalization-generated economic liberalization.  
 After constructing our hypotheses, we completed an extensive country-level 
annual dataset containing 61 variables indicating in different manners the levels of 
democracy, globalization, ethnic conflict and discrimination, and the general standing of 
the Chinese minorities vis-à-vis politically dominant and other minority ethnic groups 
across the region. Thereupon, we conducted statistical analyses to test the research 
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hypotheses. Two statistical techniques were chosen to serve that purpose - the 
Pearson's product-moment correlation coefficient and multiple linear regression 
coefficient, both able to express the nature and strength of relationships between 
different variables.  
 The results derived from the conducted statistical analyses directly contradicted 
the claims proposed by our first research hypothesis. We found that higher levels of 
democracy and globalization led to a decline in the aggregate levels of ethnic conflict in 
post-1945 Southeast Asia. Therefore, this project's first hypothesis had to be rejected. 
 After having considered the test results of our second hypothesis, we determined 
that globalization tended to lead to higher levels of anti-Chinese political and economic 
discrimination in those eight out of nine countries of the region where the Chinese 
minorities are market-dominant. However, there was no strong evidence whatsoever 
that democracy and particular degrees of Chinese market dominance had a similar effect 
upon the levels of anti-Chinese discrimination. Basing our ultimate decision on such 
outcomes, we could not fully accept as valid the claims of the second research 
hypothesis either.  
 Having empirically tested both our hypotheses in Southeast Asia, we wanted to 
situate our results in a wider global context. First we examined the historical cases of 
Central and Eastern Europe in the interwar period and the Cold War. We found that 
multiethnic democracies produced outcomes in line with the first hypothesis. In part, we 
examined the Germans and the Jews as market-dominant minorities in Central Europe 
and how multiethnic states were reworked in the post-1945 era by population transfers 
that made Central Europe more ethnically homogenous.  
 In addition, we reviewed the long-running debate with regard to the decline in 
ethnic violence and conflict around the world and its correlation with ethnic diversity. 
We saw that the post-Cold War era seemed to promise a coming wave of ethnic conflicts 
that would overwhelm states internally. Instead, more comprehensive research by Gurr 
(1999) and Cederman and his colleagues (2014) shows a broad movement in favor of 
accommodative and inclusive central government policies with regards to ethnic 
minorities. This has proven successful in abating ethnic conflicts. In the last conclusion, 
we looked at studies more closely aligned with Amy Chua's thesis. The evidence by 
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Bezemer and Jong-A-Pin (2013) in Africa seemed to confirm our results in Southeast 
Asia, and Chua's argumentation for that matter. As globalization has increased, ethnic 
violence has been on the decline in Southeast Asia for most minorities, following global 
trends. For the Chinese market-dominant ethnic groups, the dynamics has run counter 
to that trend and has exacerbated their vulnerability to conflict and ethnically-motivated 
political and economic discrimination. The same is to be anticipated for other market-
dominant ethnic minorities around the world - after all, they do indeed seem to be the 
Achilles' heel of global free market democracy. 
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